# Round 1 – Neg v Samford CK

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#### The 1AC’s failure to recognize our complicity in Native land theft guarantees continuation of endless oppression

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Ward **Churchill** 19**96** (Professor of Ethnic Studies at University of Colorado, Boulder, BA and MA in

Communications from Sangamon State, *From A Native Son* pgs 520 – 530)

I’ll debunk some of this nonsense in a moment, but first I want to take up the posture of self-proclaimed leftist radicals in the same connection. And I’ll do so on the basis of principle, because justice is supposed to matter more to progressives than to rightwing hacks. Let me say that the pervasive and near-total silence of the Left in this connection has been quite illuminating. Non-Indian activists, with only a handful of exceptions, persistently plead that they can’t really take a coherent position on the matter of Indian land rights because “unfortunately,” they’re “not really conversant with the issues” (as if these were tremendously complex). Meanwhile, they do virtually nothing, generation after generation, to inform themselves on the topic of who actually owns the ground they’re standing on. The record can be played only so many times before it wears out and becomes just another variation of “hear no evil, see no evil.” At this point, it doesn’t take Albert Einstein to figure out that the Left doesn’t know much about such things because it’s never wanted to know, or that this is so because it’s always had its own plans for utilizing land it has no more right to than does the status quo it claims to oppose. The usual technique for explaining this away has always been a sort of pro forma acknowledgement that Indian land rights are of course “really important stuff” (yawn), but that one” really doesn’t have a lot of time to get into it (I’ll buy your book, though, and keep it on my shelf, even if I never read it). Reason? Well, one is just “overwhelmingly preoccupied” with working on “other important issues”(meaning, what they consider to be more important issues). Typically enumerated are sexism, racism, homophobia, class inequities, militarism, the environment, or some combination of these. It’s a pretty good evasion, all in all. Certainly, there’s no denying any of these issues their due; they are all important, obviously so. But more important than the question of land rights? There are some serious problems of primacy and priority imbedded in the orthodox script. To frame things clearly in this regard, lets hypothesize for a moment that all of the various non-Indian movements concentrating on each of these issues were suddenly successful in accomplishing their objectives . Lets imagine that the United States as a whole were somehow transformed into an entity defined by the parity of its race, class, and genderrelations, its embrace of unrestricted sexual preference, its rejection of militarism in all forms, and its abiding concern with environmentalprotection (I know, I know, this is a sheer impossibility, but that’s my point). When all is said and done, the society resulting from this scenario is still, first and foremost, a colonialist society, an imperialist society in the most fundamental sense possible with all that this implies**.** This is true because the scenario does nothing at all to address the fact that whatever is happening happens on someone else’s land, not only without their consent, but through an adamant disregard for their rights to the land. Hence, all it means is that the immigrant or invading population has rearranged its affairs in such a way as to make itself more comfortable at the continuing expense of indigenous people. The colonial equation remains intact and may even be reinforced by a greater degree of participation, and vested interest in maintenance of the colonial order among the settler population at large. The dynamic here is not very different from that evident in the American Revolution of the late 18th century, is it? And we all know very well where that led, don’t we? Should we therefore begin to refer to socialist imperialism, feminist imperialism, gay and lesbianimperialism, environmental imperialism, African American, and la Raza imperialism? I would hope not. I would hope this is all just a matter of confusion, of muddled priorities among people who really do mean well and who’d like to do better. If so, then all that is necessary to correct the situation is a basic rethinking of what must be done., and in what order. Here, I’d advance the straightforward premise that the land rights of “First Americans” should serve as a first priority for everyone seriously committed to accomplishing positive change in North America.But before I suggest everyone jump off and adopt this priority, I suppose it’s only fair that I interrogate the converse of the proposition: if making things like class inequity andsexism the preeminent focus of progressive action in North America inevitably perpetuates the internal colonial structure of the United States,Does the reverse hold true? I’ll state unequivocally that it does not. There is no indication whatsoever that a restoration of indigenous sovereignty in Indian Country would foster class stratification anywhere, least of all in Indian Country. In fact, all indications are that when left to their own devices, indigenous peoples have consistently organized their societies in the most class-free manners. Look to the example of the Haudenosaunee (Six Nations Iroquois Confederacy). Look to the Muscogee (Creek) Confederacy. Look to the confederations of the Yaqui and the Lakota, and those pursued and nearly perfected by Pontiac and Tecumseh. They represent the very essence of enlightened egalitarianism and democracy. Every imagined example to the contrary brought forth by even the most arcane anthropologist can be readily offset by a couple of dozen other illustrations along the lines of those I just mentioned. Would sexism be perpetuated? Ask one of the Haudenosaunee clan mothers, who continue to assert political leadership in their societies through the present day. Ask Wilma Mankiller, current head of the Cherokee nation , a people that traditionally led by what were called “Beloved Women.” Ask a Lakota woman—or man, for that matter—about who it was that owned all real property in traditional society, and what that meant in terms of parity in gender relations. Ask a traditional Navajo grandmother about her social and political role among her people. Women in most traditional native societies not only enjoyed political, social, and economic parity with men, they often held a preponderance of power in one or more of these spheres. Homophobia? Homosexuals of both genders were (and in many settings still are) deeply revered as special or extraordinary, and therefore spiritually significant, within most indigenous North American cultures. The extent to which these realities do not now pertain in native societies is exactly the extent to which Indians have been subordinated to the mores of the invading, dominating culture. Insofar as restoration of Indian land rights is tied directly to the reconstitution of traditional indigenous social, political, and economic modes, you can see where this leads: the relations of sex and sexuality accord rather well with the aspirations of feminist and gay rights activism. How about a restoration of native land rights precipitating some sort of “environmental holocaust”? Let’s get at least a little bit real here. If you’re not addicted to the fabrications of Smithsonian anthropologists about how Indians lived, or George Weurthner’s Eurosupremacist Earth First! Fantasies about how we beat all the wooly mammoths and mastodons and saber-toothed cats to death with sticks, then this question isn’t even on the board. I know it’s become fashionable among Washington Post editorialists to make snide references to native people “strewing refuse in their wake” as they “wandered nomadically about the “prehistoric” North American landscape. What is that supposed to imply? That we, who were mostly “sedentary agriculturalists” in any event. Were dropping plastic and aluminum cans as we went? Like I said, lets get real. Read the accounts of early European arrival, despite the fact that it had been occupied by 15 or 20 million people enjoying a remarkably high standard of living for nobody knows how long: 40,000 years? 50,000 years? Longer? Now contrast that reality to what’s been done to this continent over the past couple of hundred years by the culture Weurthner, the Smithsonian, and the Post represent, and you tell me about environmental devastation. That leaves militarism and racism. Taking the last first, there really is no indication of racism in traditional Indian societies. To the contrary, the record reveals that Indians habitually intermarried between groups, and frequently adopted both children and adults from other groups. This occurred in precontact times between Indians, and the practice was broadened to include those of both African and European origin—and ultimately Asian origin as well—once contact occurred. Those who were naturalized by marriage or adoption were considered members of the group, pure and simple. This was always the Indian view. The Europeans and subsequent Euroamerican settlers viewed things rather differently, however, and foisted off the notion that Indian identity should be determined primarily by “blood quantum,” an outright eugenics code similar to those developed in places like Nazi Germany and apartheid South Africa. Now that’s a racist construction if there e\ver was one. Unfortunately, a lot of Indians have been conned into buying into this anti- Indian absurdity, and that’s something to be overcome. But there’s also solid indication that quite a number of native people continue to strongly resist such things as the quantum system. As to militarism, no one will deny that Indians fought wars among themselves both before and after the European invasion began. Probably half of all indigenous peoples in North America maintained permanent warrior societies. This could perhaps be reasonably construed as “militarism,” but not, I think, with the sense the term conveys within the European/Euro-American tradition. There were never, so far as anyone can demonstrate,, wars of annihilation fought in this hemisphere prior to the Columbian arrival, none. In fact, it seems that it was a more or less firm principle of indigenous warfare not to kill, the object being to demonstrate personal bravery, something that could be done only against a live opponent. There’s no honor to be had in killing another person, because a dead person can’t hurt you. There’s no risk. This is not to say that nobody ever died or was seriously injured in the fighting. They were, just as they are in full contact contemporary sports like football and boxing. Actually, these kinds of Euro-American games are what I would take to be the closest modern parallels to traditional inter-Indian warfare. For Indians, it was a way of burning excess testosterone out of young males, and not much more. So, militarism in the way the term is used today is as alien to native tradition as smallpox and atomic bombs. Not only is it perfectly reasonable to assert that a restoration of Indian control over unceded lands within the United States would do nothing to perpetuate such problems as sexism and classism, but the reconstitution of indigenous societies this would entail stands to free the affected portions of North America from such maladies altogether. Moreover, it can be said that the process should have a tangible impact in terms of diminishing such oppressions elsewhere. The principles is this: sexism, racism, and all the rest arose here as a concomitant to the emergence and consolidation of the Eurocentric nation-state form of sociopolitical and economic organization. Everything the state does, everything it can do, is entirely contingent on its maintaining its internal cohesion, a cohesion signified above all by its pretended territorial integrity, its ongoing domination of Indian Country. Given this, it seems obvious that the literal dismemberment of the nation-state inherent to Indian land recovery correspondingly reduces the ability of the state to sustain the imposition of objectionable relations within itself. It follows that realization of indigenous land rights serves to undermine or destroy the ability of the status quo to continue imposing a racist, sexist, classist, homophobic, militaristic order on non-Indians.

#### Lack of decolonization will result in our eventual extinction it is try or die for the Aff

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Churchill, 99

WARD CHURCHILL, TITLE:A Breach of Trust: The Radioactive Colonization of Native North America SOURCE: American Indian Culture and Research Journal 23 no4 1999

 It is worth observing that the ensuing decolonization of Native North America would offer benefits to humanity extending far beyond itself. Every inch of territory and attendant resources withdrawn from U.S. "domestic" hegemony diminishes the relative capacity of America's corporate managers to project themselves outward via multilateral trade agreements and the like, consummating a New World Order in which most of the globe is to be subordinated and exploited in accordance with models already developed, tested, and refined through their applications to Indian country.(FN220) Overall, elimination of this threat yields the promise of an across-the-board recasting of relations between human beings, and of humans with the rest of nature, which is infinitely more equitable and balanced than anything witnessed since the beginnings of European expansionism more than 500 years ago.(FN221) In the alternative, if the current psychopolitical/socioeconomic status quo prevails, things are bound to run their deadly course. Felix Cohen's figurative miners will inevitably share the fate of their canary, the genocide they so smugly allow as an "acceptable cost of doing business" blending perfectly into their own autogenocide until the grim prospect of species extinction has at last been realized. There is, to be sure, a certain unmistakable justice attending the symmetry of this scenario ("What goes around, comes around," as Charles Manson liked to say).(FN222) But, surely, we--all of us, settlers and Natives--owe more to our future generations than to bequeath them a planet so thoroughly irradiated as to deny them the possibility of life itself.

#### Our advocacy is that the United States federal government should leave the planet.

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Churchill, 04

Ward Churchill; August 24, 2004, Resistance to War, Occupation, and Empire, <http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=6088>,

Every square inch of terra firma of Turtle Island that purportedly forms this corporate structure, the geographical integrity, the territorial integrity of these mega-States is land that was taken directly from Native people. That consolidation of an internal colonial empire is what it is that makes the outward power projection known as globalization possible now. Of course, it is in itself a part of an earlier phase of globalization. We used to call globalization by its proper name: we called it imperialism. We called it imperialism and we fashioned ourselves to be anti- imperialists, and we took that as a priority, a basic formative aspect of our consciousness. So what I'm suggesting to you right now is that in order to combat in an effective fashion this process that now goes under the name of globalization we have consciously to restore our understanding of the necessity of being - as a first priority - anti-imperialist. But we need to be anti-imperialists who have learned from the past mistakes of anti-imperialism, and that is: you don't find the symptoms when you are approximate to the cause. If you want to stop globalization you have to stop it where it lives. You do not purport to be a revolutionary in the context of an internal colonial construction. To be a revolutionary is to overthrow the existing apparatus of the State and replace it with yourselves. If you do that you perpetuate the problem. The State is contingent on its existence both in the United States and in Canada, upon the perpetual colonization, subjugation, subordination, exploitation, expropriation, of Indigenous peoples, it will continue to be illegally occupied territory until the principles of anti-imperialism are applied here not only analytically, but forcefully. The decolonisation of North America is the absolutely essential ingredient in halting the process of globalization and making it impossible ever to resuscitate it again. See it clearly for what it is, and understand the implications. All of my adult life, I've been an activist. I've been an activist full time one way or another. Every aspect of what I do is [connected] to that central task, and that central task of activism is to clarify and organize around the clarification. In the course of that activist adulthood, I have encountered and agreed with and participated in movements that aspired to certain slogans. When I started out it was "U.S. out of Vietnam," and then that was changed and it became "U.S. out of Indochina," and then it became "U.S. out of Southern Africa," and it was "U.S. out of the Caribbean and Central America," and then it became "U.S. out of the Persian Gulf." I agreed with every one of those, but ultimately there's only one way that any of them will be possible and that is: US out of North America, U.S. off the planet, and take Canada with you when you go! That creates the basis for that future alternative. That understanding and that understanding alone will create that basis. Every square inch of terra firma that is removed from the corpus of either of these mega-States, and understand when we're in Canada we are only on the Northern provinces of the United States Empire. This is the tail wagged by the dog in Washington, D.C. and never be confused about that. Ultimately, it matters not whether the end structure of Canadian proclaimed soil or US proclaimed soil, every square inch that is returned to Native control, to Native sovereign control, is one inch less they have of consolidated territory to base their power projection upon. Ultimately, if that process was complete, they would have no basis, either materially in terms of territory or materially in terms of resources, in order to conduct themselves in the world elsewhere the way they do now. And in the process they would not be able to conduct themselves here. You say that this is privileging Native rights, perhaps, beyond that of others? You say I am opposed to sexism as a first priority; you say I am opposed to ageism as a first priority; you say I am opposed to classism; I am a good Marxist, dialectical materialist; I am opposed to something else as being prior in importance to native rights? In the restoration of territory though Native rights, you place things back under Native governance in accordance with the Native tradition, and we were not ageist, we were not sexist, we were not classist, none of these 'isms ' or 'ologies' pertained. In defeating one you defeat the other and that cannot be said by reversing the order and priority of things. First Nations, first priority, first always, that has to be the rule if we are going to understand the beast and ultimately defeat it. That said, we are going right to the nerve centre of what makes the thing function and it will not stop functioning painlessly; it will resist. There is not a petition campaign that you can construct that is going to cause the power and the status quo to dissipate. There is not a legal action that you can take; you can't go into the court of the conqueror and have the conqueror announce the conquest to be illegitimate and to be repealed; you cannot vote in an alternative, you cannot hold a prayer vigil, you cannot burn the right scented candle at the prayer vigil, you cannot have the right folk song, you cannot have the right fashion statement, you cannot adopt a different diet, build a better bike path. You have to say it squarely: the fact that this power this force, this entity, this monstrosity called the State maintains itself by physical force, and can be countered only in terms that it itself dictates and therefore understands. That's a deep breath time; that's a real deep breath time. It will not be a painless process, but, hey, newsflash: it's not a process that is painless now. If you feel a relative absence of pain, that is testimony only to your position of privilege within the Statist structure. Those who are on the receiving end, whether they are in Iraq, they are in Palestine, they are in Haiti, they are in American Indian reserves inside the United States, whether they are in the migrant stream or the inner city, those who are 'othered' and of colour, in particular but poor people more generally, know the difference between the painlessness of acquiescence on the one hand and the painfulness of maintaining the existing order on the other. Ultimately, there is no alternative that has found itself in reform; there is only an alternative that founds itself - not in that fanciful word of revolution - but in the devolution, that is to say the dismantlement of Empire from the inside out.

### 1nc k 2

#### The modern energy system traps us into the belief of a false euphoric future while overlooking how this same system dooms us to ecological destruction, resource wars, democratic authoritarianism and extinction

Byrne and Toly 6—\*John Byrne, Director Center for Energy and Environmental Policy & Public Policy at Delaware and \*\*Noah Toly, Research Associate Center for Energy and Environmental Policy [*Transforming Power* eds. Byrne, Toly, & Glover p. 1-3]

From climate change to acid rain, contaminated landscapes, mercury pollution, and biodiversity loss ,2 the origins of many of our least tractable environmental problems can be traced to the operations of the modern energy system. A scan of nightfall across the planet reveals a social dilemma that also accompanies this system's operations: invented over a century ago, electric light remains an experience only for the socially privileged. Two billion human beings-almost one-third of the planet's population-experience evening light by candle, oil lamp, or open fire, reminding us that energy modernization has left intact-and sometimes exacerbated-social inequalities that its architects promised would be banished (Smi l, 2003: 370- 373). And there is the disturbing link between modern energy and war.3 Whether as a mineral whose control is fought over by the powerful (for a recent history of conflict over oil, see Klare, 2002b, 2004, 2006), or as the enablement of an atomic war of extinction, modern energy makes modern life possible and threatens its future. With environmental crisis, social inequality, and military conflict among the significant problems of contemporary energy-society relations, the importance of a social analysis of the modern energy system appears easy to establish. One might, therefore, expect a lively and fulsome debate of the sector's performance, including critical inquiries into the politics, sociology, and political economy of modern energy. Yet, contemporary discourse on the subject is disappointing: instead of a social analysis of energy regimes, the field seems to be a captive of euphoric technological visions and associated studies of "energy futures" that imagine the pleasing consequences of new energy sources and devices.4 One stream of euphoria has sprung from advocates of conventional energy, perhaps best represented by the unflappable optimists of nuclear power who ' early on, promised to invent a “magical fire” (Weinberg 1972) capable of meeting any level of energy demand inexhaustibly in a manner too c heap to meter” (Lewis Strauss, ctted tn the New York Ttmes 1954, 1955). In reply to those who fear catastrophic accidents from the "magical fire" or the prolifera~ ion of nuclear weapons, a new promise is made to realize "inherently safe reactors" (Weinberg, 1985) that risk neither serious accident nor intentionally harmful use of high-energy physics. Less grandiose, but no less optimistic, forecasts can be heard from fossil fuel enthusiasts who, likewise, project more energy, at lower cost, and with little ecological harm (see, e.g., Yergin and Stoppard, 2003). Skeptics of conventional energy, eschewing involvement with dangerously scaled technologies and their ecological consequences, find solace in "sustainable energy alternatives" that constitute a second euphoric stream. Preferring to redirect attention to smaller, and supposedly more democratic, options, "green" energy advocates conceive devices and systems that prefigure a revival of human scale development, local self-determination, and a commitment to ecological balance. Among supporters are those who believe that greening the energy system embodies universal social ideals and, as a result, can overcome current conflicts between energy "haves" and "havenots." 5 In a recent contribution to this perspective, Vaitheeswaran suggests (2003: 327, 291 ), "today's nascent energy revolution will truly deliver power to the people" as "micropower meets village power." Hermann Scheer echoes the idea of an alternative energy-led social transformation: the shift to a "solar global economy ... can satisfy the material needs of all mankind and grant us the freedom to guarantee truly universal and equal human rights and to safeguard the world's cultural diversity" (Scheer, 2002: 34).6 The euphoria of contemporary energy studies is noteworthy for its historical consistency with a nearly unbroken social narrative of wonderment extending from the advent of steam power through the spread of electricity (Nye, 1999). The modern energy regime that now powers nuclear weaponry and risks disruption of the planet's climate is a product of promises pursued without sustained public examination of the political, social, economic, and ecological record of the regime's operations. However, the discursive landscape has occasionally included thoughtful exploration of the broader contours of energy-environment-society relations. As early as 1934, Lewis Mumford (see also his two-volume Myth of the Machine, 1966; 1970) critiqued the industrial energy system for being a key source of social and ecological alienation (I 934: 196): The changes that were manifested in every department of Technics rested for the most part on one central fact: the increase of energy. Size, speed, quantity, the multiplication of machines, were all reflections of the new means of utilizing fuel and the enlargement of the available stock of fuel itself. Power was dissociated from its natural human and geographic limitations: from the caprices of the weather, from the irregularities that definitely restrict the output of men and animals. By 1961, Mumford despaired that modernity had retrogressed into a lifeharming dead end (1961: 263, 248): ... an orgy of uncontrolled production and equally uncontrolled reproduction: machine fodder and cannon fodder: surplus values and surplus populations ... The dirty crowded houses, the dank airless courts and alleys, the bleak pavements, the sulphurous atmosphere, the over-routinized and dehumanized factory, the drill schools, the second-hand experiences, the starvation of the senses, the remoteness from nature and animal activity-here are the enemies. The living organism demands ali fe-sustaining environment. Modernity's formula for two centuries had been to increase energy in order to produce overwhelming economic growth. While diagnosing the inevitable failures of this logic, Mumford nevertheless warned that modernity's supporters would seek to derail present-tense7 evaluations of the era's social and ecological performance with forecasts of a bountiful future in which, finally, the perennial social conflicts over resources would end. Contrary to traditional notions of democratic governance, Mumford observed that the modern ideal actually issues from a pseudomorph that he named the "democratic authoritarian bargain" ( 1964: 6) in which the modern energy regime and capitalist political economy join in a promise to produce "every material advantage, every intellectual and emotional stimulus [one] may desire, in quantities hardly available hitherto even for a restricted minority" **on the condition that society demands only what the regime is** capable and **willing to offer**. An authoritarian energy order thereby constructs an aspirational democracy while facilitating the abstraction of production and consumption from non-economic social values. The premises of the current energy paradigms are in need of critical study in the manner of Mumford's work if a world measurably different from the present order is to be organized. Interrogating modern energy assumptions, this chapter examines the social projects of both conventional and sustainable energy as a beginning effort in this direction. The critique explores the neglected issue of the political economy of energy, underscores the pattern of democratic failure in the evolution of modern energy, and considers the discursive continuities between the premises of conventional and sustainable energy futures.

#### Technocratic management of the environment makes extinction inevitable—no aff proposal can solve.

Crist 7 [Eileen Crist, Associate Professor of Science and Technology in Society at Virginia Tech University, 2007, “Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse,” *Telos*, Volume 141, Winter, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Telos Press, p. 49-51]

If mainstream environmentalism is catching up with the solution promoted by Teller, and perhaps harbored all along by the Bush administration, it would certainly be ironic. But the irony is deeper than incidental politics. The projected rationality of a geoengineering solution, stoked by apocalyptic fears surrounding climate change, promises consequences (both physical and ideological) that will only quicken the real ending of wild nature: "here we encounter," notes Murray Bookchin, "the ironic perversity of a 'pragmatism' that is no different, in principle, from the problems it hopes to resolve."58 Even if they work exactly as hoped, geoengineering solutions are far more similar to anthropogenic climate change than they are a counterforce to it: their implementation constitutes an experiment with the biosphere underpinned by technological arrogance, unwillingness to question or limit consumer society, and a sense of entitlement to transmogrifying the planet that boggles the mind. It is indeed these elements of techno-arrogance, unwillingness to advocate radical change, and unlimited entitlement, together with the profound erosion of awe toward the planet that evolved life (and birthed us), that constitute the apocalypse underway—if that is the word of choice, though the words humanization, colonization, or occupation of the biosphere are far more descriptively accurate. Once we grasp the ecological crisis as the escalating conversion of the planet into "a shoddy way station,"59 it becomes evident that inducing "global dimming" in order to offset "global warming" is not a corrective action but another chapter in the project of colonizing the Earth, of what critical theorists called world domination.

Domination comes at a huge cost for the human spirit, a cost that may or may not include the scale of physical imperilment and suffering that apocalyptic fears conjure. Human beings pay for the domination of the biosphere—a domination they are either bent upon or resigned to—with alienation from the living Earth.60 This alienation manifests, first and [end page 50] foremost, in the invisibility of the biodiversity crisis: the steadfast denial and repression, in the public arena, of the epochal event of mass extinction and accelerating depletion of the Earth's biological treasures. It has taken the threat of climate change (to people and civilization) to allow the tip of the biodepletion iceberg to surface into public discourse, but even that has been woefully inadequate in failing to acknowledge two crucial facts: first, the biodiversity crisis has been occurring independently of climate change, and will hardly be stopped by windmills, nuclear power plants, and carbon sequestering, in any amount or combination thereof; and second, the devastation that species and ecosystems have already experienced is what largely will enable more climate-change-driven damage to occur.

Human alienation from the biosphere further manifests in the recalcitrance of instrumental rationality, which reduces all challenges and problems to variables that can be controlled, fixed, managed, or manipulated by technical means. Instrumental rationality is rarely questioned substantively, except in the flagging of potential "unintended consequences" (for example, of implementing geoengineering technologies). The idea that instrumental rationality (in the form of technological fixes for global warming) might save the day hovers between misrepresentation and delusion: firstly, because instrumental rationality has itself been the planet's nemesis by mediating the biosphere's constitution as resource and by condoning the transformation of Homo sapiens into a user species; and secondly, because instrumental rationality tends to invent, adjust, and tweak technical means to work within given contexts—when it is the given, i.e., human civilization as presently configured economically and culturally, that needs to be changed.

#### The aff’s fantasy of control will only produce a “never-ending war” for security—blowback ensures efforts to create order out of disorder will fail.

Ritchie 11—Nick, PhD, Research Fellow at the Department of Peace Studies @ University of Bradford, Executive Committee of the British Pugwash Group and the Board of the Nuclear Information Service [“Rethinking security: a critical analysis of the Strategic Defence and Security Review” International Affairs Volume 87, Issue 2, Article first published online: 17 MAR 2011]

Third, the legitimating narrative of acting as a ‘force for good’ that emerged in the 1998 SDR to justify an expensive, expeditionary, war-fighting military doctrine in the name of ‘enlightened self-interest’ must be scrutinized. But the relationship between the rhetoric and the reality is highly questionable. From a critical perspective it can be argued that successive governments have framed interventionist policy choices as positive, progressive and ‘good’ to generate support for ‘risk transfer’ military operations of choice that are presented as essential to the security of UK citizens but in fact **reproduce** a state-centric construction of a particular ‘national role’. This reflects Hirshberg’s contention that ‘the maintenance of a positive national self-image is crucial to continued public acquiescence and support for government, and thus to the smooth, on-going functioning of the state’. 86 The notion that Afghanistan is a ‘noble cause’ for the British state reflects a state-centric concern with ideas of status and prestige and the **legitimating moral gloss** of the **‘force for good’** rhetoric. 87 Furthermore, the rhetoric of ‘enlightened self-interest’ implies that the exercise of UK military force as a ‘force for good’ will lessen security risks to the British state and citizenry by resolving current security threats and pre-empting future risks. But, returning again to Iraq and Afghanistan, we must ask whether sacrificing solders’ lives, killing over 100,000 Iraqi civilians including a disproportionate number of women and children, destroying the immediate human security of several million others through injury, displacement, persecution and trauma, and **sparking long-term trends of** rising crime rates, property **destruction**, economic disruption, and deterioration of health-care resources and food production and distribution capabilities, all while **providing profits** for largely western corporations through arms deals, service contracts and private military contractors, constitutes being a ‘force for good’ when the outcomes of these major military interventions have proven at best indeterminate. 88 The legitimacy of this question is reinforced by Curtis’s analysis of the deadly impact of British foreign policy since the 1950s. Curtis argues that ‘the history of British foreign policy is partly one of complicity in some of the world’s worst horrors … contrary to the extraordinary rhetoric of New Labour leaders and other elites, policies are continuing on this traditional course, systematically making the world more abusive of human rights as well as more unequal and less secure’. 89 Add to this the statistic that the UK was involved in more wars between 1946 and 2003 (21 in total) than any other state, and the ‘force for good’ rationale begins to unravel. 90 Furthermore, the militarized ‘force for good’ narrative encompasses the **active defence** of the ‘rules-based system’ as a global good. But it is clear that the current ‘rules-based **system’ of western-dominated multilateral institutions** and processes of global governance **does not work for billions of people or** for **planetary ecological systems**. The Human Development Reports produced by the United Nations Development Programme routinely highlight the global political and economic structures and systems that **keep hundreds of millions of people poor, starving, jobless, diseased and repressed.** 91 A stable ‘rules-based system’ is no doubt in the interests of UK citizens and the interests of global human society. With stability comes predictability, which can minimize uncertainty, risk and insecurity. But there is a **growing consensus** that long-term stability, particularly the **reduction of violent conflict**, will require **far greater political**, economic and environmental equity **on a global scale**, as advocated in the Department for International Development’s 2009 white paper on Eliminating world poverty. 92 An interventionist, military-oriented, state-centric, global risk management doctrine and the risks it can generate are unlikely to stabilize and **transform the** rules-based **system into a more equitable form**. A growing literature now argues that prevailing **western approaches to** understanding, managing and ameliorating global **insecurity** and its violent symptoms are **inadequate and unsustainable**. They are proving, and will continue to prove, increasingly incapable of providing security for both the world’s poor and immiserated, concentrated in the Global South, and the world’s elite of around one billion, mainly located in the North Atlantic community, Australasia and parts of East Asia, which will remain unable to insulate itself from violent responses to pervasive insecurity. 93 This is not to suggest that the UK should not exercise elements of national power to alleviate others’ suffering as a consequence of natural or man-made disasters. Indeed, the Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s 2001 ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine sets out clearly the principle of conditional sovereignty and the grounds for legitimate intervention when a state cannot or will not protect its citizens from pervasive and severe harm. 94 More broadly, if we accept that in an increasingly complex, interdependent world the human security of UK citizens enmeshed in global networks of risk and opportunity is intertwined with the human security of others, particularly in conflict-prone regions often characterized by poverty, weak governance and underdevelopment, then actions to improve others’ long-term human security does constitute a form of ‘enlightened self-interest’. But we must question the assumption that war-fighting interventionist missions of choice do, in fact, serve the long-term human security interests of UK citizens as opposed to the interests of the state based on prevailing conceptions of national role. Utility of force Connected to this critique is a reappraisal of the utility of force within the conception of national security as global risk management, on two counts. First, security risks are increasingly likely to arise from a complex mixture of interdependent factors. Environmental, economic, military and political sources of insecurity could include the effects of climate change, mass poverty and economic injustice, global pandemic disease, mass migration and refugee flows, poor governance, weak and failing states, international terrorism and asymmetric warfare, the spread of WMD and advanced conventional military technologies, ethnic and sectarian nationalism, and competition over access to key resources such as oil and water. Future conflicts are therefore likely to be complex and diverse. They are unlikely to be susceptible to purely military solutions, and the use of military force in regional crises will be messy, indeterminate and of limited value and effectiveness. 95 It is not obvious that the armed forces have a significant war-fighting role to play in mitigating these risks, as opposed to supporting police, intelligence and security forces in countering terrorist plots—and possibly launching a limited, precision strike against WMD capabilities in the event of the extreme scenario of robust intelligence that a WMD attack is imminent. In fact, the 2009 National Security Strategy limited the role of the armed forces to ‘defence against direct threats to the UK and its overseas territories’ (which one could qualify as ‘direct violent, or military, threats’) together with a contributory role in ‘tackling threats to our security overseas by helping to address conflict, instability and crises across the globe’. 96 This broad but essentially supportive remit for the military was reinforced in the 2010 National Security Strategy’s catalogue of priority risks. The three-tiered list enumerated 15 risks, which can be reduced to five: terrorism, civil emergencies, international crime, trade disputes and an attack by another state. 97 The role of military force is limited in all of these except the last, which remains by far the least likely. As Jenkins argues, almost none of the above is a threat. They are crimes, catastrophes, or, in the case of being ‘drawn in’ to a foreign conflict, a matter of political choice … as for the threat of conventional attack on the British Isles by another state, we can only ask who? The threat is so negligible as to be insignificant. It is like insuring one’s house for billions of pounds against an asteroid attack. 98 Bob Ainsworth, then Defence Secretary, seemed to grasp this in 2009, arguing that ‘our initial conclusions on the character of warfare should be first that international intervention will be more difficult not less. We will have to consider carefully how to apply military force in pursuit of national security. And second, and related to this, that the timely application of soft power and methods of conflict prevention will be a high priority.’ 99 Yet the government also insists on maintaining an interventionist, expeditionary military doctrine and corresponding capabilities based on a seemingly unquestioned national security role as a ‘force for good’ in global risk management operations. Second, risk management through military intervention in a complex international security environment characterized by asymmetric cultures, actors and distributions of power and knowledge, and interconnections on many levels, can generate **significant** negativefeedback, or ‘blowback’, from **unintended outcomes** that create more risk. This challenges notions of effective risk management and control through linear change via the exercise of military power. 100 In fact, as Williams argues, **the decision to act to mitigate a risk itself becomes risky**: in the attempt to maintain control, negative feedback from the effects of a decision ‘**inevitably leads to a** loss of control’. 101 The danger is that military-based risk management becomes a cyclical process **with no end in sight**. 102 Rogers, for example, presciently envisaged a post-9/11 ‘never-ending war’ of military-led risk mitigation generatingnew and potentially more dangerous **risks** deemed susceptible to further military solutions, and so on. 103 This risk is not limited to distant theatresof conflict, but also applies to the very ‘way of life’ the current militarized risk management doctrine is meant to protect, through the **erosion of civil liberties** and the **securitization of daily life.** There is a powerful argument that the exercise of UK military force for optional expeditionary war-fighting operations will be an increasingly dangerous, expensive and ethically dubious doctrine that could **generate more**, and potentially **more lethal, risks than it resolves** or contains. Since absolute security cannot be achieved, the value of any potential, discretionary increment in UK security through the exercise of military force must take into account its political, economic and human cost. As Wolfers argues, ‘at a certain point, by something like the economic law of diminishing returns, the gain in security no longer compensates for the added costs of attaining it’, and the exercise of military force becomes ineffective or, worse, **wholly counterproductive.** 104 After following George W. Bush on a risky adventure into Iraq, the UK must question the effectiveness of a militarized ‘risk transfer’ strategy as the foundation for managing globalized security risks in relation to the long-term human security needs of British citizens.

#### Vote neg – must investigate epistemological underpinnings of energy production – alternative is a “growth at all costs” society that culminates in endless crises and oppression

**Holleman 12** – Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Oregon

(Hannah, “ENERGY JUSTICE AND FOUNDATIONS FOR A SUSTAINABLE SOCIOLOGY OF ENERGY”, <http://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/jspui/bitstream/1794/12419/1/Holleman_oregon_0171A_10410.pdf>, dml)

All work on energy, society, and climate change may be divided into two broader theoretically significant categories based on its main underlying assumptions. On the one hand, there are sociologists whose proposals to solve global issues like climate change **involve tweaking the system** through policy, personal consumption choices, or technological change. On the other hand, you have sociologists **calling for** system-wide social and ecological change. In other words, some sociologists limit their studies to **changes that are possible** within the capitalist system, while others document the ways in which **capitalism is** incompatible **with** ecological and social **justice goals** and call for a **more significant transformation** of the world system.

One reason this central divide is so relevant to energy studies is that climate change has been **driven by the economic growth inherent to capitalism**. The key conflict that arises in climate negotiations, and which is constantly alluded to in environmental negotiations between nations, is that between ecological, social, and economic priorities (Clark and York 2005; Bazilian 2009; York 2010). Energy developments are **conditioned by these competing priorities**. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA 2008) puts the issue plainly: “Energy use is largely driven by economic growth.” Problems with energy developments are thus in large part problems of scale **related to the level of economic throughput**. And the scale of energy consumption remains coupled in capitalist economies with economic growth in spite of efficiency gains, as critical sociologists of energy have demonstrated (York 2010; York, et al. 2011). For this reason, energy debates, like other issues in environmental sociological theory, often **center on the tension between economic growth and ecological change**. There are striking differences in how this tension and the possibility of overcoming it are understood by various theoretical positions. The most influential approach to energy issues in the broader society and policy circles is mirrored in environmental sociology in the ecological modernization perspective. It is the most optimistic that the tension between economic growth and ecological change may be transcended (social justice is not integrated in their analysis.)

Ecological modernizationists emphasize “the possibility, actuality and desirability of a green Capitalism” (Mol and Jänicke 2009, 23). They claim there is a “growing independence of ecological rationality vis-à-vis other (e.g. economic and political) rationalities” (22) in the governance of society and institutions. “The basic premise of ecological modernization theory is…[that there is a] centripetal movement of ecological interests, ideas and considerations in social practices and institutions of modern society” (Mol 2002, 93). The authors see “continued industrial [and technological] development as offering **the best option for escaping from the ecological crises** of the developed world” (Fisher and Freudenburg 2001, 702). This new breed of modernizers suggest “we have entered a new industrial revolution, one of radical restructuring of production, consumption, state practices and political discourses along ecological lines” (Sonnenfield 2009, 372).

Ecological modernization began as “**essentially a political program**” (Mol and Jänicke 2009, 18) and remains **geared toward** influencing policy (Mol, Sonnenfield, and Spaargaren 2009, 11). That this perspective **might be popular in a world where those in power suggest capitalism will solve the climate crisis** it created is not surprising. Ecological modernization theorists themselves have represented the significance of their ideas via the extent to which **they share the perspective of** those in power, and by the taming of the environmental movement, which was forced into an establishment mold (Spaargaren and Mol 2009, 72–75).

Though it integrates popular assumptions, the ecological modernization perspective actually **is in conflict with** over a hundred years **of sociological and ecological analyses** (starting with that of the classical theorists, like Marx and Weber, and early energy scholars developing the study thermodynamics). This insidious perspective also is in conflict with the founding principles of environmental sociology, based on the New Ecological Paradigm, which include “recognition of: (1) limits to growth, (2) nonanthropocentrism, (3) fragility of nature’s balance, (4) untenability of exemptionalism, and (5) ecological crisis” (Foster 2012). Therefore, Foster (2012) refers to the ecological modernization perspective as the new exemptionalism and the third stage of denialism **hindering necessary and urgent scientific development and change**:

The third stage of denial has the look and feel of greater realism, but actually constitutes a more desperate and dangerous response. It admits that capitalism is the problem, but also **contends that capitalism is the solution**. This general approach emphasizes what is variously referred to as "sustainable capitalism," "natural capitalism," "climate capitalism," "green capitalism," etc. In this view we can continue down the same road of capital accumulation, mounting profits, and exponential economic growth -- while at the same time miraculously reducing our burdens on the planetary environment. It is business as usual, but with greater efficiency and greater accounting of environmental costs. (Foster 2011a)

Ecological modernization is a way then to **avoid** any significant challenge **to the status quo**. Because of this it **ignores the** seriousness **and** scale **of ecological degradation** (York and Rosa 2003), but also **the inequalities** necessarily embedded **in the social relations of capitalism**. There is no real gender, race, class, or any kind of social justice analysis there, **even if justice is mentioned in passing** in their work (usually in response previous criticisms).

Despite all of these problems, the penetration of the assumptions undergirding this perspective is clear in the sociology of energy and climate change. The conscious and unconscious adoption of the main tenets of the modernization framework stands out in the sociology articles published since the boom in climate change research starting in 2005. A key term search in Sociological Abstracts of the 1,734 peer-reviewed articles published since 2005 with “climate change” or “energy” in the title yields the following results: many more mention technology (424), technological change (96), alternative energy (110), or renewable energy (160) than mention energy conservation (120), economic growth (96), or capitalism (35). Shockingly, only 22 mention inequality and only 9 equality.

**The blinders imposed by** perspectives such as **ecological modernization** in the sociological work on energy and climate change, and broader environmental sociological theory, means that

environmental sociology today is therefore faced with a double challenge, emanating both from without and within: developing means to combat the planetary rift, and confronting the new exemptionalism, which threatens to overthrow environmental sociology as a critical tradition. With respect to the latter challenge, the problem is to be found **not in the concept of ecological modernization itself,** which is obviously useful in limited contexts, and reflects real-world processes, but rather the elevation of ecological modernization **into an overall environmental theory resurrecting the basic postulates of human exemptionalism**. (Foster 2012)

This makes the theoretical perspective proposed in this thesis all the more important **and** urgent, for the sociology of energy and for environmental sociology as a whole. Because the sociology of energy is taking off, **the climate crisis is only worsening, and** new scholars **are being trained en masse,** it is a crucial moment **in the theoretical development** of what will now be sustained sociological attention to energy. As bad as things are, they are only expected to get worse. Energy increasingly will be forced onto the broader sociological agenda (Dunlap 2010; Webler and Tuler 2010). **If energy justice is not** at the heart of the sociology of energy that takes root, our formulations will necessarily **impose blinders that make it** impossible to understand**, or** propose meaningful changes **to address, the interpenetrating depredations of social inequality and environmental destruction** associated with the modern energy regime.

### 1nc warming

#### No extinction – empirically denied

**Carter 11–** Robert, PhD, Adjuct Research Fellow, James Cook University, Craig Idso, PhD, Chairman at the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Fred Singer, PhD, President of the Science and Environmental Policy Project, Susan Crockford, evolutionary biologist with a specialty in skeletal taxonomy , paleozoology and vertebrate evolution, Joseph D’Aleo, 30 years of experience in professional meteorology, former college professor of Meteorology at Lyndon State College, Indur Goklany, independent scholar, author, and co-editor of the Electronic Journal of Sustainable Development, Sherwood Idso, President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Research Physicist with the US Department of Agriculture, Adjunct Professor in the Departments of Geology, Botany, and Microbiology at Arizona State University, Bachelor of Physics, Master of Science, and Doctor of Philosophy, all from the University of Minnesota, Madhav Khandekar, former research scientist from Environment Canada and is an expert reviewer for the IPCC 2007 Climate Change Panel, Anthony Lupo, Department Chair and Professor of Atmospheric Science at the University of Missouri, Willie Soon, astrophysicist at the Solar and Stellar Physics Division of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, Mitch Taylor (Canada) (March 8th, “[Surviving](file:///C%3A%5CUsers%5CMarc%5CDesktop%5CSurviving) the Unpreceented Climate Change of the IPCC” <http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2011/mar/8mar2011a5.html>) Jacome

On the other hand, they indicate that some biologists and climatologists have pointed out that "many of the predicted increases in climate have happened before, in terms of both magnitude and rate of change (e.g. Royer, 2008; Zachos *et al*., 2008), and yet biotic communities have remained remarkably resilient (Mayle and Power, 2008) and in some cases thrived (Svenning and Condit, 2008)." But they report that those who mention these things are often "placed in the 'climate-change denier' category," although the purpose for pointing out these facts is simply to present "a sound scientific basis for understanding biotic responses to the magnitudes and rates of climate change predicted for the future through using the vast data resource that we can exploit in fossil records." Going on to do just that, Willis *et al*. focus on "intervals in time in the fossil record when atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased up to 1200 ppm, temperatures in mid- to high-latitudes increased by greater than 4°C within 60 years, and sea levels rose by up to 3 m higher than present," describing studies of past biotic responses that indicate "the scale and impact of the magnitude and rate of such climate changes on biodiversity." And what emerges from those studies, as they describe it, "is evidence for rapid community turnover, migrations, development of novel ecosystems and thresholds from one stable ecosystem state to another." And, most importantly in this regard, they report "there is very little evidence for broad-scale extinctions due to a warming world." In concluding, the Norwegian, Swedish and UK researchers say that "based on such evidence we urge some caution in assuming broad-scale extinctions of species will occur due solely to climate changes of the magnitude and rate predicted for the next century," reiterating that "the fossil record indicates remarkable biotic resilience to wide amplitude fluctuations in climate.

#### Turn – CO2 helps ag – key to biodiversity and water preservation

**Carter 11**, Robert, PhD, Adjuct Research Fellow, James Cook University, Craig Idso, PhD, Chairman at the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Fred Singer, PhD, President of the Science and Environmental Policy Project, Susan Crockford, evolutionary biologist with a specialty in skeletal taxonomy , paleozoology and vertebrate evolution, Joseph D’Aleo, 30 years of experience in professional meteorology, former college professor of Meteorology at Lyndon State College, Indur Goklany, independent scholar, author, and co-editor of the Electronic Journal of Sustainable Development, Sherwood Idso, President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Research Physicist with the US Department of Agriculture, Adjunct Professor in the Departments of Geology, Botany, and Microbiology at Arizona State University, Bachelor of Physics, Master of Science, and Doctor of Philosophy, all from the University of Minnesota, Madhav Khandekar, former research scientist from Environment Canada and is an expert reviewer for the IPCC 2007 Climate Change Panel, Anthony Lupo, Department Chair and Professor of Atmospheric Science at the University of Missouri, Willie Soon, astrophysicist at the Solar and Stellar Physics Division of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, Mitch Taylor (Canada) [“Climate Change Reconsidered 2011 Interim Report,” September, Science and Environmental Policy Project, Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Published by The Heartland Institute]

Several years ago, Waggoner (1995) rhetorically asked: How much land can ten billion people spare for nature? That was the title of an essay he wrote to illuminate the dynamic tension between the need for land to support the agricultural enterprises that sustain mankind and the need for land to support the natural ecosystems that sustain all other creatures. As noted by Huang et al. (2002), human populations ―have encroached on almost all of the world‘s frontiers, leaving little new land that is cultivatable.‖ And in consequence of humanity‘s ongoing usurpation of this most basic of natural resources, Raven (2002) has noted ―species-area relationships, taken worldwide in relation to habitat destruction, lead to projections of the loss of fully two-thirds of all species on earth by the end of this century.‖ In addition, Wallace (2000) has calculated we will need to divert essentially all usable non-saline water on the face of the Earth to the agricultural enterprises that will be required to meet the food and fiber needs of humanity‘s growing numbers well before that. So what parts of the world are likely to be hit hardest by the great land-grabbing and water-consuming machine of humanity? Tilman et al. (2001) report developed countries are expected to withdraw large areas of land from farming between now and the middle of the century (2050), leaving developing countries to shoulder essentially all of the growing burden of feeding our expanding population. In addition, they calculate the loss of these countries‘ natural ecosystems to crops and pasture represent about half of all potentially suitable remaining land, which ―could lead to the loss of about a third of remaining tropical and temperate forests, savannas, and grasslands,‖ along with the many unique species they support. If one were to pick the most significant problem currently facing the biosphere, this would probably be it: a single species of life, Homo sapiens, is on course to annihilate two-thirds of the ten million or so other species with which we share the planet within the next several decades, simply by taking their land and water. Global warming, by comparison, pales in significance, as its impact is nowhere near as severe and in fact may be neutral or even positive. In addition, its chief cause is highly debated, and actions to thwart it are much more difficult, if not impossible, to define and implement. Furthermore, what many people believe to be the main cause of global warming—anthropogenic CO2 emissions—may actually be a powerful force for preserving land and water for nature. In an analysis of the problem of human land-use expansion, Tilman et al. (2002) introduced a few more facts before suggesting some solutions. They noted, for example, that by 2050 the human population of the globe is projected to be 50 percent larger than it was in 2000, and that global grain demand could double because of expected increases in per-capita real income and dietary shifts toward a higher proportion of meat. Hence, they stated the obvious when they concluded, ―raising yields on existing farmland is essential for ‗saving land for nature‘.‖ So how is it to be done? Tilman et al. (2002) suggested a strategy built around three essential tasks: (1) increasing crop yield per unit land area, (2) increasing crop yield per unit of nutrients applied, and (3) increasing crop yield per unit of water used. Regarding the first of these requirements, Tilman et al. note that in many parts of the world the historical rate of increase in crop yields is declining, as the genetic ceiling for maximal yield potential is being approached

. This observation, in their words, ―highlights the need for efforts to steadily increase the yield potential ceiling.‖ With respect to the second requirement, they indicate, ―without the use of synthetic fertilizers, world food production could not have increased at the rate it did [in the past] and more natural ecosystems would have been converted to agriculture.‖ Hence, they state the solution ―will require significant increases in nutrient use efficiency, that is, in cereal production per unit of added nitrogen, phosphorus,‖ and so forth. Finally, as to the third requirement, Tilman et al. remind us ―water is regionally scarce,‖ and ―many countries in a band from China through India and Pakistan, and the Middle East to North Africa either currently or will soon fail to have adequate water to maintain per capita food production from irrigated land.‖ Increasing crop water use efficiency, therefore, is also a must. Although the impending biological crisis and several important elements of its potential solution are thus well defined, Tilman et al. (2001) noted ―even the best available technologies, fully deployed, cannot prevent many of the forecasted problems.‖ This was also the conclusion of Idso and Idso (2000), who stated that although ―expected advances in agricultural technology and expertise will significantly increase the food production potential of many countries and regions,‖ these advances ―will not increase production fast enough to meet the demands of the even faster-growing human population of the planet.‖ Fortunately, we have a powerful ally in the ongoing rise in the air‘s CO2 content that can provide what we can‘t. Since atmospheric CO2 is the basic ―food‖ of essentially all plants, the more of it there is in the air, the bigger and better they grow. For a nominal doubling of the air‘s CO2 concentration, for example, the productivity of Earth‘s herbaceous plants rises by 30 to 50 percent (Kimball, 1983; Idso and Idso, 1994), and the productivity of its woody plants rises by 50 to 80 percent or more (Saxe et al. 1998; Idso and Kimball, 2001). Hence, as the air‘s CO2 content continues to rise, the land use efficiency of the planet will rise right along with it. In addition, atmospheric CO2 enrichment typically increases plant nutrient use efficiency and plant water use efficiency. Thus, with respect to all three of the major needs identified by Tilman et al. (2002), increases in the air‘s CO2 content pay huge dividends, helping to increase agricultural output without the taking of new land and water from nature.

#### Biodiversity loss leads to extinction

**Young 10 –** PhD coastal marine ecology[Ruth, “Biodiversity: what it is and why it’s important”, February 9th, <http://www.talkingnature.com/2010/02/biodiversity/biodiversity-what-and-why/>]

Different species within ecosystems fill particular roles, they all have a function, **they all have a niche**. They interact with each other and the physical environment to provide ecosystem services that are **vital for our survival**. For example plant species convert carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere and energy from the sun into useful things such as food, medicines and timber. Pollination carried out by insects such as bees enables the [production of ⅓ of our food crops](http://www.talkingnature.com/2010/01/biodiversity/bees-pollination/). Diverse mangrove and coral reef ecosystems provide a wide variety of habitats that are essential for many fishery species. To make it simpler for economists to comprehend the magnitude of services offered by biodiversity, a team of researchers estimated their value – it amounted to $US33 trillion per year. “By protecting biodiversity we maintain ecosystem services” Certain species play a *“keystone”* role in maintaining ecosystem services. Similar to the removal of a keystone from an arch, the removal of these species can result in the collapse of an ecosystem and the subsequent removal of ecosystem services. The most well known example of this occurred during the 19th century when sea otters were almost hunted to extinction by fur traders along the west coast of the USA. This led to a population explosion in the sea otters’ main source of prey, sea urchins. Because the urchins graze on kelp their booming population decimated the underwater kelp forests. This loss of habitat led to declines in local fish populations. Sea otters are a keystone species once hunted for their fur (Image: Mike Baird) Eventually a treaty protecting sea otters allowed the numbers of otters to increase which inturn controlled the urchin population, leading to the recovery of the kelp forests and fish stocks. In other cases, ecosystem services are maintained by entire functional groups, such as apex predators (See [Jeremy Hance’s post at Mongabay)](http://news.mongabay.com/2010/0202-hance_toppredators.html). During the last 35 years, over fishing of large shark species along the US Atlantic coast has led to a population explosion of skates and rays. These skates and rays eat bay scallops and their out of control population has led to the closure of a century long scallop fishery. These are just two examples demonstrating how biodiversity can maintain the services that ecosystems provide for us, such as fisheries. One could argue that to maintain ecosystem services we don’t need to protect biodiversity but rather, we only need to protect the species and functional groups that fill the**keystone roles**. However, there are a *couple of problems with this idea*. First of all, for most ecosystems **we don’t know which species are the keystones!** *Ecosystems are so complex* that we are still discovering which species play vital roles in maintaining them. In some cases its *groups of species* not just one species that are *vital for the ecosystem*. Second, even if we did complete the enormous task of identifying and protecting all keystone species, **what back-up plan would we have** if an unforseen event (e.g. pollution or disease) led to the demise of these ‘keystone’ species? **Would there be another species to save the day**

and take over this role? Classifying some species as ‘keystone’ implies that the others are not important. This may lead to the non-keystone species being considered ecologically worthless and subsequently over-exploited. Sometimes we may not even know which species are likely to fill the keystone roles. An example of this was discovered on Australia’s Great Barrier Reef. This research examined what would happen to a coral reef if it were over-fished. The “over-fishing” was simulated by fencing off coral bommies thereby excluding and removing fish from them for three years. By the end of the experiment, the reefs had changed from a coral to an algae dominated ecosystem – the coral became overgrown with algae. When the time came to remove the fences the researchers expected herbivorous species of fish like the parrot fish (Scarus spp.) to eat the algae and enable the reef to switch back to a coral dominated ecosystem. But, surprisingly, the shift back to coral was driven by a supposed ‘unimportant’ species – the bat fish (Platax pinnatus). The bat fish was previously thought to feed on invertebrates – small crabs and shrimp, but when offered a big patch of algae it turned into a hungry herbivore – a cow of the sea – grazing the algae in no time. So a fish previously thought to be ‘unimportant’ is actually a keystone species in the recovery of coral reefs overgrown by algae! *Who knows how many other species are out there with unknown ecosystem roles!* In some cases it’s easy to see who the keystone species are but in many ecosystems seemingly unimportant or redundant species are also capable of changing niches and maintaining ecosystems. The **more biodiverse** an ecosystem is, the more likely these species will be present and the **more resilient** an ecosystem is to future impacts. Presently we’re only scratching the surface of understanding the full importance of biodiversity and how it helps maintain ecosystem function. The scope of this task is immense. In the meantime*, a wise insurance policy for maintaining ecosystem services would be to conserve biodiversity*. In doing so, we increase the chance of maintaining our ecosystem services in the event of future impacts such as disease, invasive species and of course, climate change. This is the international year of biodiversity – a time to recognize that biodiversity makes **our survival on this planet** possible and that our protection of biodiversity maintains this service.

### 1nc heg

#### Heg causes war and prolif- balancing takes out the benefits of heg

**Monteiro 11** \*Nuno P. Monteiro is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University [<http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00064>, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is not Peaceful”]

A unipole carrying out a defensive-dominance strategy will seek to preserve all three aspects of the status quo: maintaining the territorial boundaries and international political alignments of all other states, as well as freezing the global distribution of power. 60 This strategy can lead to conflict in two ways, both of which stem from uncertainty about the unipole’s intentions. First, not knowing the extent of the unipole’s determination to pursue a strategy of defensive dominance may spur some minor powers to develop their capabilities. Second, uncertainty about the degree to which the unipole will oppose small changes to the status quo may lead some minor powers to attempt them. In both cases, the opposition of the unipole to these actions is likely to lead to war. In this section, I lay out these two pathways to conflict and then illustrate them with historical examples. To be sure, states can never be certain of other states’ intentions. 61 There are a couple of reasons, however, why this uncertainty increases in unipolarity, even when the unipole appears to be determined to maintain the status quo. First, other states cannot be certain that the unipole will always pursue nonrevisionist goals. This is particularly problematic because unipolarity minimizes the structural constraints on the unipole’s grand strategy. As Waltz writes, “Even if a dominant power behaves with moderation, restraint, and forbearance, weaker states will worry about its future behavior. . . . The absence of se rious threats to American security gives the United States wide latitude in making foreign policy choices.” 62 Second, unipolarity takes away the principal tool through which minor powers in bipolar and multipolar systems deal with uncertainty about great power intentions—alliances with other great powers. Whereas in these other systems minor powers can, in principle, attenuate the effects of uncertainty about great power intentions through external balancing, in a unipolar world no great power sponsor is present by definition. In effect, the systemic imbalance of power magnifies uncertainty about the unipole’s intentions. 63 Faced with this uncertainty, other states have two options. First, they can accommodate the unipole and minimize the chances of conºict but at the price of their external autonomy. 64 Accommodation is less risky for major powers because they can guarantee their own survival, and they stand to beneªt greatly from being part of the unipolar system. 65 Major powers are therefore unlikely to attempt to revise the status quo. Minor powers are also likely to accommodate the unipole, in an attempt to avoid entering a confrontation with a preponderant power. Thus, most states will accommodate the unipole because, as Wohlforth points out, the power differential rests in its favor. 66 Accommodation, however, entails greater risks for minor powers because their survival is not assured if the unipole should turn against them. Thus some of them are likely to implement a second strategic option—resisting the unipole. The structure of the international system does not entirely determine whether or not a minor power accommodates the unipole. Still, structure conditions the likelihood of accommodation in two ways. To begin, a necessary part of a strategy of dominance is the creation of alliances or informal security commitments with regional powers. Such regional powers, however, are likely to have experienced conºict with, or a grievance toward, at least some of its neighboring minor powers. The latter are more likely to adopt a recalcitrant posture. Additionally, by narrowing their opportunities for regional integration and security maximization, the unipole’s interference with the regional balance of power is likely to lower the value of the status quo for these minor powers. 67 As the literature on the “value of peace” shows, countries that attribute a low value to the status quo are more risk acceptant. This argument helps explain, for example, Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 and Syria’s and Egypt’s decision to attack Israel in 1973. 68 In both cases, aggressor states knew that their capabilities were significantly weaker than those of their targets. They were nonetheless willing to run the risk of launching attacks because they found the prewar status quo unacceptable. 69 Thus, for these states, the costs of balancing were lower relative to those of bandwagoning. In an international system with more than one great power, recalcitrant minor powers would, in principle, be able to balance externally by finding a great power sponsor. 70 In unipolarity, however, no such sponsors exist. 71 Only major powers are available, but because their survival is already guaranteed, they are likely to accommodate the unipole. And even if some do not, they are unlikely to meet a recalcitrant minor power’s security needs given that they possess only limited power-projection capabilities. 72 As such, recalcitrant minor powers must defend themselves, which puts them in a position of extreme selfhelp. There are four characteristics common to states in this position: (1) anarchy, (2) uncertainty about other states’ intentions, (3) insufªcient capabilities to deter a great power, and (4) no potential great power sponsor with whom to form a balancing coalition. The ªrst two characteristics are common to all states in all types of polarity. The third is part of the rough-and-tumble of minor powers in any system. The fourth, however, is unique to recalcitrant minor powers in unipolarity. This dire situation places recalcitrant minor powers at risk for as long as they lack the capability to defend themselves. They depend on the goodwill of the unipole and must worry that the unipole will shift to a strategy of offensive dominance or disengagement. Recalcitrant minor powers will therefore attempt to bolster their capabilities through internal balancing. To deter an eventual attack by the unipole and bolster their chances of survival in the event deterrence fails, recalcitrant minor powers will attempt to reinforce their conventional defenses, develop the most effective asymmetric strategies possible, and, most likely in the nuclear age, try to acquire the ultimate deterrent—survivable nuclear weapons. 73 In so doing, they seek to become major powers. Defensive dominance, however, also gives the unipole reason to oppose any such revisions to the status quo. First, such revisions decrease the benefits of systemic leadership and limit the unipole’s ability to convert its relative power advantage into favorable outcomes. In the case of nuclear weapons, this limitation is all but irreversible, virtually guaranteeing the recalcitrant regime immunity against any attempt to coerce or overthrow it. Second, proliferation has the potential to produce regional instability, raising the risk of arms races. These would force the unipole to increase defense spending or accept a narrower overall relative power advantage. Third, proliferation would lead to the emergence of a recalcitrant major power that could become the harbinger of an unwanted large-scale balancing attempt. The unipole is therefore likely to demand that recalcitrant minor powers not revise the status quo. The latter, however, will want to resist such demands because of the threat they pose to those states’ security. 74 Whereas fighting over such demands would probably lead to defeat, conceding to them peacefully would bring the undesired outcome with certainty. A preventive war is therefore likely to ensue. In the second causal path to war, recalcitrant minor powers test the limits of the status quo by making small revisions—be they territorial conquests, altered international alignments, or an increase in relative power—evocative of Thomas Schelling’s famous “salami tactics.” 75 The unipole may not, however, accept these revisions, and instead demand their reversal. For a variety of reasons, including incomplete information, commitment problems, and the need for the minor power to establish a reputation for toughness, such demands may not be heeded. As a result, war between the unipole and recalcitrant minor powers emerges as a distinct possibility. 76 Regardless of the causal path, a war between the unipole and a recalcitrant minor power creates a precedent for other recalcitrant minor powers to boost their own capabilities. Depending on the unipole’s overall capabilities—that is, whether it can launch a second simultaneous conºict—it may also induce other recalcitrant minor powers to accelerate their balancing process. Thus, a war against a recalcitrant minor power presents other such states with greater incentives for, and (under certain conditions) higher prospects of, assuring their survival by acquiring the necessary capabilities, including nuclear weapons. At the same time, and depending on the magnitude of the unipole’s power preponderance, a war against a recalcitrant minor power creates an opportunity for wars among major and minor powers—including major power wars. To the extent that the unipole’s power preponderance is limited by its engagement in the ªrst war, **its ability to manage confrontations** between other states elsewhere is curtailed, increasing the chances that these will erupt into military conflicts. Therefore, even when the unipole is engaged, war remains a possibility. Between the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States generally implemented a strategy of defensive dominance. During this period, the dynamics described in this section can be seen at work in the cases of the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 1999 Kosovo War, as well as in the Kargil War between India and Pakistan, and in North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear programs. On August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein ordered his forces to invade Kuwait, convinced the United States would not oppose this revision of the status quo. During the months that followed, the United States assembled an international coalition determined to restore Kuwaiti independence, and it obtained UN authorization to use force if Iraq did not withdraw its occupation forces by January 15, 1991. Two days after this deadline, the U.S.-led coalition began military action against Iraqi forces, expelling them from Kuwait in six weeks. 77 Two points deserve mention. First, the Gulf War was triggered by Iraq’s miscalculation regarding whether the United States would accept Iraqi annexation of Kuwait. At the outset of the unipolar era, great uncertainty surrounded the limits of what actions U.S. decisionmakers would find permissible. 78 Iraq miscalculated the degree of U.S. ºexibility, and war ensued. Second, the war was made possible by unipolarity, which placed Iraq in a situation of extreme selfhelp. Indeed, lack of a great power sponsor—at the time, the Soviet Union was in strategic retrenchment—was duly noted in Baghdad. Immediately after the war, Saddam’s foreign minister, Tariq Aziz, lamented, “We don’t have a patron anymore. . . . If we still had the Soviets as our patron, none of this would have happened.” 79 Similarly, in 1999, Serbian leaders miscalculated U.S. tolerance to ethnic violence in Kosovo, a secessionist province of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In March 1999, reacting to increasing brutality in the province, the international community convened a conference, which produced the Rambouillet accords. This agreement called for the restoration of Kosovo’s autonomy and the deployment of NATO peacekeeping forces, both unacceptable to Serbian authorities, who refused to submit to it. 80 In response, NATO launched a bombing campaign in Yugoslavia. In early June, after nine weeks of bombing, NATO offered the Serbian leadership a compromise, which it accepted, ending the war. 81 Once the war had started and it became clear that Serbia had overreached, Belgrade relied on the support of its ancestral major power ally, Russia. Serbian strategy during the war thus aimed in part at buying time for Russia to increase pressure on NATO to cease hostilities. Contrary to Belgrade’s expectations, however, Russian support for Serbian aims eroded as the war continued. On May 6, Russia agreed with the Group of Seven nations on a plan that included the deployment of UN peacekeepers and a guarantee of Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity. By mid-May, faced with Serbia’s obduracy, Moscow began to press its ally to accept the offer. Thus, not only did Russian support fail to prevent a U.S.-led intervention, but it was instrumental in convincing Serbia to accede to NATO’s demands. 82 The only war between major powers to have occurred thus far in a unipolar world—the Kargil War between India and Pakistan—started, as my theory would have predicted, while the United States was involved in Kosovo. 83 In May 1999, India detected Pakistani forces intruding into the Kargil sector in Indian-controlled Kashmir. This action triggered the ªrst Indo-Pakistani war of the nuclear age, which ended on July 4—after the cessation of military operations in Kosovo—when President Bill Clinton demanded Pakistan’s withdrawal, which occurred on July 26. 84 In the absence of a great power sponsor and uncertain of U.S. intentions, Iran and North Korea—both recalcitrant minor powers—have made considerable efforts to bolster their relative power by developing a nuclear capability. Unsurprisingly, the United States has consistently opposed their efforts, but has so far been unable to persuade either to desist. The North Korean nuclear program dates to the 1960s, but most of the nuclear development was conducted in a world with a status quo unipole. 85 Throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s, North Korea sought to elude U.S. opposition without ever crossing the nuclear threshold. The North Korean regime seemed to have understood that the United States would view an explicit move toward a nuclear breakout as an extreme provocation and raise the possibility of a preventive war. When the United States shifted to a strategy of offensive dominance in late 2001, however, Pyongyang wasted little time in acquiring its nuclear deterrent. Iran, too, pursued a nuclear program throughout the 1990s. 86 The Iranian nuclear program, started in the 1950s, gained new impetus with the end of the Cold War as the result of a conºuence of factors: the 1989 replacement of an antinuclear supreme leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, with a pronuclear Ayatollah Ali Khamenei; the discovery of Iraq’s covert nuclear program during the 1991 Gulf War; and, above all, an increased U.S. presence in the region following that war. 87 A decade later, the expansion of Iran’s nuclear program prompted the State Department to proclaim, “We believe Iran’s true intent is to develop the capability to produce ªssile material for nuclear weapons.” 88 Iran’s nuclear program continued throughout the period in which the United States shifted toward a strategy of offensive dominance, to which I turn next.

#### Extinction

**Asal and Beardsley 09** (Victor, Department of Political Science, State University of New York, Albany, and Kyle, Department of Political Science, Emory University, Winning with the Bomb, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/uploads/Beardsley-Asal_Winning_with_the_Bomb.pdf>)

Conclusion Why do states proliferate? Nuclear weapons and the programs necessary to create them are expensive. They are dangerous. Other countries may attack a state while it is trying to create a nuclear arsenal and there is always the risk of a catastrophic accident. They may help generate existential threats by encouraging first strike incentives amongst a state's opponents. This paper has explored the incentives that make nuclear weapons attractive to a wide range of states despite their costly and dangerous nature. We have found that nuclear weapons provide more than prestige, they provide leverage. They are useful in coercive diplomacy, and this must be central to any explanation of why states acquire them. Since 9 August 1945 no state has used a nuclear weapon against another state, but we find evidence that the possession of nuclear weapons helps states to succeed in their confrontations with other states even when they do not “use” them. Conflict with nuclear actors carries with it a potential danger that conflict with other states simply does not have. Even though the probability of full escalation is presumably low, the evidence confirms that the immense damage from the possibility of such escalation is enough to make an opponent eager to offer concessions. Asymmetric crises allow nuclear states to use their leverage to good effect. When crises involve a severe threat – and nuclear use is not completely ruled out – the advantage that nuclear actors have is substantial. Nuclear weapons help states win concessions quickly in 25 salient conflicts. Consistent with the other papers in this issue and the editors’ introduction (Gartzke and Kroenig this issue), we report that nuclear weapons confer tangible benefits to the possessors. These benefits imply that there should be a general level of demand for nuclear weapons, which means that explanations for why so few states have actually proliferated should focus more on the supply side, as applied by Matthew Kroenig (this issue) and Matthew Fuhrmann (this issue). The findings here importantly suggest an additional reason why “proliferation begets proliferation,” in the words of George Shultz (Shultz 1984, 18). If both parties to a crisis have nuclear weapons, the advantage is effectively cancelled out. When states develop nuclear weapons, doing so may encourage their rivals to also proliferate for fear of being exploited by the shifting bargaining positions. And once the rivals proliferate, the initial proliferator no longer has much bargaining advantage. On the one hand, this dynamic adds some restraint to initial proliferation within a rivalry relationship: states fear that their arsenal will encourage their rivals to pursue nuclear weapons, which will leave them no better off (Davis 1993; Cirincione 2007). On the other hand, once proliferation has occurred, all other states that are likely to experience coercive bargaining with the new nuclear state will also want nuclear weapons. The rate of proliferation has the potential to accelerate because the desire to posses the “equalizer” will increase as the number of nuclear powers slowly rises. Our theoretical framework and empirical findings are complementary to Gartzke and Jo (this issue), who posit and find that nuclear states enjoy greater influence in the international realm. An interesting dynamic emerges when comparing the results to Rauchhaus (this issue), who finds that nuclear weapons in asymmetric dyads tend to increase the propensity for escalation. We have argued that nuclear weapons improve the bargaining leverage of the 26 possessors and tested that proposition directly. It is important to note that the factors that shape conflict initiation and escalation are not necessarily the same factors that most shape the outcome of the conflict. Even so, one explanation for why a stronger bargaining position does not necessarily produce less escalation is that escalation is a function of decisions by both sides, and even though the opponent of a nuclear state is more willing to back down, the nuclear state should be more willing to raise its demands and push for a harder bargain in order to maximize the benefits from the nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons appear to need ever-greater shares of their bargains in order to be satisfied, which helps to explain both their proclivity to win and their proclivity toward aggressive coercive diplomacy. An important implication in light of these findings is thus that even though nuclear weapon states tend to fare better at the end of their crises, this does not necessarily mean that the weapons are a net benefit for peace and stability.

#### Unipolarity destroys coordination necessary to stop the next epidemic-abandoning heg solves

**Weber et al. 7 \***Steven Weber is a Professor of Political Science at UC-Berkeley and Director of the Institute of International Studies, Naazneen Barma, Matthew Kroenig, Ely Ratner, [“How Globalization Went Bad”, January-February 2007, Foreign Policy]

The same is true for global public health. Globalization is turning the world into an enormous petri dish for the incubation of infectious disease. Humans cannot outsmart disease, because it just evolves too quickly. Bacteria can reproduce a new generation in less than 30 minutes, while it takes us decades to come up with a new generation of antibiotics. **Solutions are only possible when and where we get the upper hand**. Poor countries where humans live in close proximity to farm animals are the best place to breed extremely dangerous zoonotic disease. **These are often the same countries, perhaps not entirely coincidentally, that feel threatened by American powe**r. Establishing an early warning system for these diseases—exactly what we lacked in the case of SARS a few years ago and exactly what we lack for avian flu today—will require a significant level of intervention into the very places that don’t want it. That will be true as long as international intervention means American interference. The most likely sources of the next ebola or HIV-like pandemic are the countries that simply won’t let U.S. or other Western agencies in, including the World Health Organization. Yet the threat is too arcane and not immediate enough for the West to force the issue. What’s needed is another great power to take over a piece of the work, a power that has more immediate interests in the countries where diseases incubate and one that is seen as less of a threat. **As long as the United States remains the world’s lone superpower, we’re not likely to get any help.** Even after HIV, SARS, and several years of mounting hysteria about avian flu, the world is still not ready for a viral pandemic in Southeast Asia or sub-Saharan Africa. America can’t change that alone.

#### Disease – It leads to extinction

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Senate Majority Leader Frist describes the recent slew of emerging diseases in almost biblical terms: “All of these [new diseases] were advance patrols of a great army that is preparing way out of sight.”3146 Scientists like Joshua Lederberg don’t think this is mere rhetoric. He should know. Lederberg won the Nobel Prize in medicine at age 33 for his discoveries in bacterial evolution. Lederberg went on to become president of Rockefeller University. “Some people think I am being hysterical,” he said, referring to pandemic influenza, “but there are catastrophes ahead. We live in evolutionary competition with microbes—bacteria and viruses. There is no guarantee that we will be the survivors.”3147 There is a concept in host-parasite evolutionary dynamics called the Red Queen hypothesis, which attempts to describe the unremitting struggle between immune systems and the pathogens against which they fight, each constantly evolving to try to outsmart the other.3148 The name is taken from Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass in which the Red Queen instructs Alice, “Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do to keep in the same place.”3149 Because the pathogens keep evolving, our immune systems have to keep adapting as well just to keep up. According to the theory, animals who “stop running” go extinct. So far our immune systems have largely retained the upper hand, but the fear is that given the current rate of disease emergence, the **human race is losing the race**.3150 In a Scientific American article titled, “Will We Survive?,” one of the world’s leading immunologists writes: Has the immune system, then, reached its apogee after the few hundred million years it had taken to develop? Can it respond in time to the new evolutionary challenges? These perfectly proper questions lack sure answers because we are in an utterly unprecedented situation [given the number of newly emerging infections].3151 The research team who wrote Beasts of the Earth conclude, “Considering that bacteria, viruses, and protozoa had a more than two-billion-year head start in this war, a victory by recently arrived Homo sapiens would be remarkable.”3152 Lederberg ardently believes that emerging viruses may imperil human society itself. Says NIH medical epidemiologist David Morens, When you look at the relationship between bugs and humans, the more important thing to look at is the bug. When an enterovirus like polio goes through the human gastrointestinal tract in three days, its genome mutates about two percent. That level of mutation—two percent of the genome—has taken the human species eight million years to accomplish. So who’s going to adapt to whom? Pitted against that kind of competition, Lederberg concludes that the human evolutionary capacity to keep up “may be dismissed as almost totally inconsequential.”3153 To help prevent the evolution of viruses as threatening as H5N1, the least we can do is take away a few billion feathered test tubes in which viruses can experiment, a few billion fewer spins at pandemic roulette. The human species has existed in something like our present form for approximately 200,000 years. “Such a long run should itself give us confidence that our species will continue to survive, at least insofar as the microbial world is concerned. Yet such optimism,” wrote the Ehrlich prize-winning former chair of zoology at the University College of London, “might easily transmute into a tune whistled whilst passing a graveyard.”3154

## 2NC – case and energy k

### heg bad

#### Wars won’t go nuclear if the u.s. isn’t the hegemon because we won’t intervene

**Gholz et al. 97** \*Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press are doctoral candidates in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Harvey M. Sapolsky is Professor of Public Policy and Organization in the Department of Political Science at M.I.T. and Director of the M.I.T. Defense and Arms Control Studies (DACS) Program. This paper began as a project for the DACS Working Group on Defense Politics [Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation, International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring, 1997), pp. 5-48, PDF]

THE INCREASED CHANCE OF GREAT POWER WAR Several prominent analysts favor a policy of selective engagement.70 These analysts fear that American military retrenchment would increase the risk of great power war. A great power war today would be a calamity, even for those countries that manage to stay out of the fighting. The best way to prevent great power war, according to these analysts, is to remain engaged in Europe and East Asia. Twice in this century the United States has pulled out of Europe, and both times great power war followed. Then America chose to stay engaged, and the longest period of European great power peace ensued. In sum, selective engagers point to the costs of others' great power wars and the relative ease of preventing them. The selective engagers' strategy is wrong for two reasons. First, selective engagers overstate the effect of U.S. military presence as a positive force for great power peace. In today's world, disengagement will not cause great power war, and continued engagement will not reliably prevent it. In some circum- stances, engagement may actually increase the likelihood of conflict. Second, selective engagers overstate the costs of distant wars and seriously understate the costs and risks of their strategies. Overseas deployments require a large force structure. Even worse, selective engagement will ensure that when a future great power war erupts, the United States will be in the thick of things. Although distant great power wars are bad for America, the only sure path to ruin is to step in the middle of a faraway fight. Selective engagers overstate America's effect on the likelihood of future great power wars. There is little reason to believe that withdrawal from Europe or Asia would lead to deterrence failures. With or without a forward U.S. pres- ence, America's major allies have sufficient military strength to deter any potential aggressors. Conflict is far more likely to erupt from a sequence described in the spiral model. The danger of spirals leading to war in East Asia is remote. Spirals happen when states, seeking security, frighten their neighbors. The risk of spirals is great when offense is easier than defense, because any country's attempt to achieve security will give it an offensive capability against its neighbors. The neighbors' attempts to eliminate the vulnerability give them fleeting offensive capabilities and tempt them to launch preventive war.71 But Asia, as discussed earlier, is blessed with inherent defensive advantages. Japan and Taiwan are islands, which makes them very difficult to invade. China has a long land border with Russia, but enjoys the protection of the East China Sea, which stands between it and Japan. The expanse of Siberia gives Russia, its ever- trusted ally, strategic depth. South Korea benefits from mountainous terrain which would channel an attacking force from the north. Offense is difficult in East Asia, so spirals should not be acute. In fact, no other region in which great powers interact offers more defensive advantage than East Asia. The prospect for spirals is greater in Europe, but continued U.S. engagement does not reduce that danger; rather, it exacerbates the risk. A West European military union, controlling more than 21 percent of the world's GDP, may worry Russia. But NATO, with 44 percent of the world's GDP, is far more threatening, especially if it expands eastward. The more NATO frightens Rus- sia, the more likely it is that Russia will turn dangerously nationalist, redirect its economy toward the military, and try to re-absorb its old buffer states.72 But if the U.S. military were to withdraw from Europe, even Germany, Europe's strongest advocate for NATO expansion, might become less enthusiastic, be- cause it would be German rather than American troops standing guard on the new borders. Some advocates of selective engagement point to the past fifty years as evidence that America's forward military presence reduces the chance of war. The Cold War's great power peace, however, was overdetermined. Nuclear weapons brought a powerful restraining influence.73 Furthermore, throughout the Cold War, European and Asian powers had a common foe which encour- aged them to cooperate. After an American withdrawal, the Japanese, Koreans, and Russians would still have to worry about China; the Europeans would still need to keep an eye on Russia. These threats can be managed without U.S. assistance, and the challenge will encourage European and Asian regional cooperation. In fact, some evidence suggests that America's overseas presence was not the principal cause of great power peace during the Cold War; nuclear weapons and the presence of a unifying threat played a greater role. The Sino-Soviet dispute has been one of the bitterest in the world since the 1960s. The Soviets and Chinese have had all the ingredients for a great power war-border disputes, hostile ideologies, and occasional military clashes along their fron- tier-yet they managed to keep things from getting out of hand. Maybe the presence of nuclear weapons damped the conflict; maybe having a common foe (the United States) tempered their hostility toward each other. But it is clear that U.S. engagement was not necessary for peaceful great power relations during the Cold War. Some analysts agree that the probability of great power wars stemming from American withdrawal is very low, but they still advocate engagement because they fear low-probability, high-cost events. A war would be a human tragedy, the environment would suffer, and international trade would be disrupted. But the costs of distant great power wars must be compared to the costs of the strategy intended to prevent them. Advocates of selective engagement argue that their policy's costs are small.74 We disagree with this assessment. Two costs are associated with selective en- gagement and both are high: the cost of maintaining forces in Europe and Asia and the risk that, with engagement, the United States will have to fight a war. Maintaining substantial military power in Europe and Asia and the capability to surge forces to the Persian Gulf will require most of America's current mili- tary assets, a two-MRC force. Any savings from force cuts will be marginal.75 The larger long-term cost of selective engagement is the risk of involvement in faraway great power wars. Great power conflicts will continue to be a rare occurrence, but when they happen, the United States is much better off staying as far away from the combatants as possible. World War II resulted in the deaths of 400,000 Americans, many times that number wounded, and nearly 40 percent of GDP devoted to defense (compared to 4 percent today).76 A new great power conflict, with the possibility of nuclear use, might exact even higher costs from the participants. World War II was fought to prevent the consolidation of Europe and Asia by hostile, fanatical adversaries, but a new great power war would not raise that specter. The biggest cost of selective engagement is the risk of being drawn into someone else's faraway great power war. The global economy may be disrupted by war, depending on who is in- volved, but even in the worst case, the costs would be manageable. Trade accounts for roughly 20 percent of the American economy,77 and sudden, forced autarky would be devastating for American prosperity. But no great power war could come close to forcing American autarky: essentially all goods have substitute sources of supply at varying marginal increases in cost. Furthermore, wars never isolate the fighting countries completely from external trade. Some dislocation is a real possibility, but these short-term costs would not justify the risks of fighting a great power war. The risk of nuclear escalation is a reason to worry about great power war, but it is a highly suspect reason to favor a military policy that puts U.S. forces between feuding great powers. Nuclear weapons may not be used in a future great power war; the fear of retaliation should breed great caution on the part of the belligerents.78 But the larger point is that the possibility of a faraway **nuclear exchange is precisely the reason** that America should keep its military forces out of other country's disputes.79 An Indo-Pakistani nuclear war would be a terrible thing, but it makes no sense to get in the middle. Distant wars would be costly, but not nearly as costly as the solution that selective engagers propose. Five decades ago, America's leaders asked the people to defend the world from Soviet military power. Admirably, Americans rose to the occasion. But now they are being asked to shoulder a dangerous new burden: to protect the great powers from themselves. Before undertaking this costly and dangerous "social science experiment," Americans should look closely at the costs of engagement, the prospects for success, and the risks if things go awry Careful comparison shows restraint to be the better strategy.

### overview

#### Social justice outweighs – structural violence is a proximate cause to war – psychologically ingrains genocidal tendencies into humanity which is the root of escalation in warfare – ethics demands a neg ballot

**Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4**

(Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn)

(Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)

This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “**little” violences** produced in the **structures**, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the **ease** with which humans are capable of **reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons** and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “**invisible” genocides** not because they are secreted away or **hidden from view**, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematic- ally and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a **genocidal capacity** among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive **hypervigilance** to the less dramatic, **permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible** (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which **mass violence and genocide** are born, it is **ingrained** in the **common sense of everyday social life**. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “**priming**” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push **social consensus** toward **devaluing** certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

#### Comparative evidence – focus on nuclear extinction is misplaced, has no scientific basis, and reifies imperialism

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(Brian, “Extinction politics”, <http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/84sana1.html>, dml)

By the 1950s, a large number of people had come to believe that the killing of much or all of the world's population would result from global nuclear war. This idea was promoted by the peace movement, among which the idea of 'overkill' - in the sense that nuclear arsenals could kill everyone on earth several times over - became an article of faith. Yet in spite of the widespread belief in nuclear extinction, there was almost no scientific support for such a possibility. The scenario of the book and movie On the Beach,[2] with fallout clouds gradually enveloping the earth and wiping out all life, was and is fiction. The scientific evidence is that fallout would only kill people who are immediately downwind of surface nuclear explosions and who are heavily exposed during the first few days. Global fallout has no potential for causing massive immediate death (though it could cause up to millions of cancers worldwide over many decades).[3] In spite of the lack of evidence, large sections of the peace movement have left unaddressed the question of whether nuclear war inevitably means global extinction. The next effect to which beliefs in nuclear extinction were attached was ozone depletion. Beginning in the mid-1970s, scares about stratospheric ozone developed, culminating in 1982 in the release of Jonathan Schell's book The Fate of the Earth.[4] Schell painted a picture of human annihilation from nuclear war based almost entirely on effects from increased ultraviolet light at the earth's surface due to ozone reductions caused by nuclear explosions. Schell's book was greeted with adulation rarely observed in any field. Yet by the time the book was published, the scientific basis for ozone-based nuclear extinction had almost entirely evaporated. The ongoing switch by the military forces of the United States and the Soviet Union from multi-megatonne nuclear weapons to larger numbers of smaller weapons means that the effect on ozone from even the largest nuclear war is unlikely to lead to any major effect on human population levels, and extinction from ozone reductions is virtually out of the question.[3] The latest stimulus for doomsday beliefs is 'nuclear winter': the blocking of sunlight from dust raised by nuclear explosions and smoke from fires ignited by nuclear attacks. This would result in a few months of darkness and lowered temperatures, mainly in the northern mid-latitudes.[5] The effects could be quite significant, perhaps causing the deaths of up to several hundred million more people than would die from the immediate effects of blast, heat and radiation. But the evidence, so far, seems to provide little basis for beliefs in nuclear extinction. The impact of nuclear winter on populations nearer the equator, such as in India, does not seem likely to be significant. The most serious possibilities would result from major ecological destruction, but this remains speculative at present. As in the previous doomsday scenarios, antiwar scientists and peace movements have taken up the crusading torch of extinction politics. Few doubts have been voiced about the evidence about nuclear winter or the politics of promoting beliefs in nuclear extinction. Opponents of war, including scientists, have often exaggerated the effects of nuclear war and emphasized worst cases. Schell continually bends evidence to give the worst impression. For example, he implies that a nuclear attack is inevitably followed by a firestorm or conflagration. He invariably gives the maximum time for people having to remain in shelters from fallout. And he takes a pessimistic view of the potential for ecological resilience to radiation exposure and for human resourcefulness in a crisis. Similarly, in several of the scientific studies of nuclear winter, I have noticed a strong tendency to focus on worst cases and to avoid examination of ways to overcome the effects. For example, no one seems to have looked at possibilities for migration to coastal areas away from the freezing continental temperatures or looked at people changing their diets away from grain-fed beef to direct consumption of the grain, thereby greatly extending reserves of food. Nuclear doomsdayism should be of concern because of its effect on the political strategy and effectiveness of the peace movement. While beliefs in nuclear extinction may stimulate some people into antiwar action, it may discourage others by fostering resignation. Furthermore, some peace movement activities may be inhibited because they allegedly threaten the delicate balance of state terror. The irony here is that there should be no need to exaggerate the effects of nuclear war, since, even well short of extinction, the consequences would be sufficiently devastating to justify the greatest efforts against it. The effect of extinction politics is apparent in responses to the concept of limited nuclear war. Antiwar activists, quite justifiably, have attacked military planning and apologetics for limited nuclear war in which the effects are minimized in order to make them more acceptable. But opposition to military planning often has led antiwar activists to refuse to acknowledge the possibility that nuclear war could be 'limited' in the sense that less than total annihilation could result. A 'limited' nuclear war with 100 million deaths is certainly possible, but the peace movement has not seriously examined the political implications of such a war. Yet even the smallest of nuclear wars could have enormous political consequences, for which the peace movement is totally unprepared.[6] The peace movement also has denigrated the value of civil defence, apparently, in part, because a realistic examination of civil defence would undermine beliefs about total annihilation. The many ways in which the effects of nuclear war are exaggerated and worst cases emphasized can be explained as the result of a presupposition by antiwar scientists and activists that their political aims will be fulfilled when people are convinced that there is a good chance of total disaster from nuclear war.[7] There are quite a number of reasons why people may find a belief in extinction from nuclear war to be attractive.[8] Here I will only briefly comment on a few factors. The first is an implicit Western chauvinism The effects of global nuclear war would mainly hit the population of the United States, Europe and the Soviet Union. This is quite unlike the pattern of other major ongoing human disasters of starvation, disease, poverty and political repression which mainly affect the poor, nonwhite populations of the Third World. The gospel of nuclear extinction can be seen as a way by which a problem for the rich white Western societies is claimed to be a problem for all the world. Symptomatic of this orientation is the belief that, without Western aid and trade, the economies and populations of the Third World would face disaster. But this is only Western self-centredness. Actually, Third World populations would in many ways be better off without the West: the pressure to grow cash crops of sugar, tobacco and so on would be reduced, and we would no longer witness fresh fish being airfreighted from Bangladesh to Europe. A related factor linked with nuclear extinctionism is a belief that nuclear war is the most pressing issue facing humans. I disagree, both morally and politically, with the stance that preventing nuclear war has become the most important social issue for all humans. Surely, in the Third World, concern over the actuality of massive suffering and millions of deaths resulting from poverty and exploitation can justifiably take precedence over the possibility of a similar death toll from nuclear war. Nuclear war may be the greatest threat to the collective lives of those in the rich, white Western societies but, for the poor, nonwhite Third World peoples, other issues are more pressing. In political terms, to give precedence to nuclear war as an issue is to assume that nuclear war can be overcome in isolation from changes in major social institutions, including the state, capitalism, state socialism and patriarchy. If war is deeply embedded in such structures - as I would argue[9] - then to try to prevent war without making common cause with other social movements will not be successful politically. This means that the antiwar movement needs to link its strategy and practice with other movements such as the feminist movement, the workers' control movement and the environmental movement. A focus on nuclear extinction also encourages a focus on appealing to elites as the means to stop nuclear war, since there seems no other means for quickly overcoming the danger. For example, Carl Sagan, at the end of an article about nuclear winter in a popular magazine, advocates writing letters to the presidents of the United States and of the Soviet Union.[10] But if war has deep institutional roots, then appealing to elites has no chance of success. This has been amply illustrated by the continual failure of disarmament negotiations and appeals to elites over the past several decades.

### fw

#### We enrich energy discussion – their framework masks over oppression, is epistemologically bankrupt, and causes serial policy failure

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(Hannah, “ENERGY JUSTICE AND FOUNDATIONS FOR A SUSTAINABLE SOCIOLOGY OF ENERGY”, <http://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/jspui/bitstream/1794/12419/1/Holleman_oregon_0171A_10410.pdf>, dml)

Linking our knowledge of social and ecological crises creates a basis for **an approach to energy that is** sociologically coherent **(recognizing** systemic injustices **and** power inequalities) and ecologically grounded. Recent work towards making such links may be found in systems ecology and in broader environmental sociological theory, in particular, the theory of the ecological rift, feminist ecology, and the environmental justice literature. Scholars from each of these latter perspectives have called for **more integrated theory in environmental sociology**, with greater attention given to the relationship between injustice and ecological degradation (Pellow 2000, 2007; Salleh 2009; Foster, York, and Clark 2010). Coming out of the natural sciences, systems ecologist and energy scholar Howard T. Odum also went to significant lengths to unite social and ecological science, with a focus on the urgent need for society at one and the same time to address environmental inequalities and restore the earth’s systems, disrupted as a result of capitalism’s growth (Odum 2007). Odum worked to overcome the nature/society dualism highlighted as a theoretical weakness in sociology by feminist ecologists, among others, by bringing economy and ecology under a unified ecological analysis. My goal is to put these theoretical developments in a context in which they can **complement one another and informs the ongoing development of the critical sociology of energy**.

The ecological rift: A framework for synthesis

Feminist ecologist Ariel Salleh (2010) highlighted that we remain in need of developing an integrated ecosocial analysis that recognizes the primary importance of “reproductive activities and regenerative provisioning” and includes “inputs by class, race, and sex-gendered others” (213, 215). Salleh sees the basis for an integrated theoretical approach in the ecological rift analysis emerging from Marxist sociology:

Climate change, biodiversity loss, and social precarity are each results of capitalist overproduction. In responding to this globalizing overshoot, **activists need a** materialist analysis **of social relations**, as well as a materialism that engages ecological processes. The dialectical tools of Marxist sociology already offer a basis for such a synthesis, but it remains a big ask for wider publics, because Eurocentric convention splits economics and ecology apart. (205)

The ecological rift framework, **which integrates** social**,** economic**, and** ecological **analysis, also puts** social justice **at its center**. Because it adopts an **openly emancipatory framework**, in ecological and social terms, it is an instance of “strong reflexivity” in theory, characterized by **a** critical distance **from the status quo that makes it possible to** question everything (Foster, Clark, and York 2010, 305). This separates it from approaches characterized by what feminist standpoint theorists refer to as examples of “weak objectivity” that “attempt to separate the positive from the normative” (305). **Objectivity**, the way it is sometimes understood, **is** never possible **in this society** “because science is **a socially embedded and often an elitist activity**, such exclusion of values is impossible” (305). Not acknowledging this reality results in social science that **unreflexively adopts the master perspective, therefore often reflecting the** conceptual limits **of the dominant ideology**.

**Absent “strong reflexivity**” on the part of social science, **it is** impossible **to see the ways** in which “our ontological concepts of nature are often **bound to systems of oppression**” (305). Strong reflexivity in environmental social science demands adopting the vantage point of those deemed “Others” and a basis in critical ecology (306). Such reflexivity is at the heart of the ecological rift perspective. It thus builds on the best classical work and at the same time is **part of the development of critical approaches** in environmental sociology, such as critical human ecology, feminist ecology, and environmental justice, that break down disciplinary boundaries and make a contemporary, critical sociology of energy, with **energy justice** at its core, possible.

**Vote neg - methodological investigation is a prior question to the aff – strict policy focus creates a myth of objectivity that sustains a violent business-as-usual approach**

**Scrase and Ockwell 10** (J. Ivan - Sussex Energy Group, SPRU (Science and Technology Policy Research), Freeman Centre, University of Sussex, David G - Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, SPRU, Freeman Centre, University of Sussex, “The role of discourse and linguistic framing effects in sustaining high carbon energy policy—An accessible introduction,” Energy Policy: Volume 38, Issue 5, May 2010, Pages 2225–2233)

The way in which **energy policy is “framed**” refers to the **underlying assumptions policy is based on** and the ways in which **policy debates ‘construct’, emphasise and link particular issues**. For example energy ‘security of supply’ is often emphasised in arguments favouring nuclear-generated electricity. A more limited framing effect operates on individuals in opinion polls and public referendums: here the way in which questions are posed has a strong influence on responses. The bigger, **social framing** effect referred to here **colours societies’ thinking** about whole areas of public life, in this case energy use and its environmental impacts. A key element of the proposed reframing advanced by commentators concerned with decarbonising energy use (see, for example, [Scrase and MacKerron, 2009](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib25)) is to cease treating energy as just commercial units of fuel and electricity, and instead to focus on the energy ‘services’ people need (warmth, lighting, mobility and so on). This paper helps to explain why any such reframing, however logical and appealing, is politically very challenging if it goes against the perceived interests of powerful groups, particularly when these interests are aligned with certain imperatives which governments must fulfil if they are to avoid electoral defeat. There is a **dominant conception** of **policy-making as an objective, linear process**. In essence the process is portrayed as proceeding in a series of steps from facts to analysis, and then to solutions (for a detailed critique of this linear view see [Fischer, 2003](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib11)). In reality, policy-making is usually messy and political, rife with the exercise of **interests and power**. **The veneer of objective, rational policy-making**, that the dominant, linear model of policy-making supports is therefore cause for concern. It effectively **sustains energy policy ‘business as usual’ and excludes** many **relevant voices that might be effective in opening up space to reframe energy policy problems and move towards more sustainable solutions** (see, for example, [Ockwell, 2008](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib21)). This echoes concerns with **what counts as knowledge** and whose voices are heard in policy debates that have characterised strands of several literatures in recent decades, including science and technology studies, sociology of scientific knowledge, and various strands of the political science and development literatures, particularly in the context of knowledge, discourse and democracy. An alternative to the linear model is provided by a ‘discourse’ perspective. This draws on political scientists’ observations of ways in which politics and policy-making proceed through the use of language, and the expression of values and the assumptions therein. Discourse can be understood as: ‘… a **shared way of apprehending the world**. **Embedded in language** it enables subscribers to **interpret bits of information** and put them together into **coherent stories** or accounts. Each discourse **rests on assumptions**, judgements and contentions that provide the basic terms for analysis, debates, agreements and disagreements…’ [Dryzek (1997, p.8)](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib5). A discursive approach rejects the widely held assumption that policy language is a **neutral medium** through which ideas and an objective world are represented and discussed ([Darcy, 1999](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib4)). Discourse analysts examine and explain language use in a way that helps to **reveal the underlying interests, value judgements and beliefs** that are often **disguised by policy actors’** factual claims and the arguments that these are used to support. For example UK energy policy review documents issued in 2006–2007 are criticised below for presenting information in ways that subtly but consistently favoured new nuclear power while purporting to be undecided on the issue. People (including scientific and policy experts) **base their understanding of problems and solutions on their knowledge, experiences, interpretations and value judgements**. These are **coloured and shaped** by social interactions, for example by what is considered an ‘appropriate’ perspective in one's work life within certain institutions. Policy actors therefore expend considerable effort on influencing the design and evolution of institutions in order to ensure problems and solutions are framed in ways they favour. Thus discourse is fundamental to the way that institutions are created, but in the short-term institutions also have a constraining or structuring effect. At a more fundamental level there are even more rigid constraints, which can be identified as a set of core imperatives, such as sustained economic growth and national security, which states and their governments, with very few exceptions, must fulfil in order to ensure their survival ([Dryzek et al., 2003](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471%22%20%5Cl%20%22bib6)—these are explored in detail further below).

### perm

#### Only our starting point ensures equity—we should be citizens not consumers.

[GREEN]

Dubash and Williams 6—Navroz Dubash, IDFC Chair Professor of Governance and Public Policy @ Nat’l Inst. of Public Finance and Policy and James Williams, Lecturer Berkeley Energy and Resources Group [*Transforming Power* eds. Byrne, Toly, & Glover p. 164]

To think of electricity as a social project means to acknowledge electricity's transformative potential and to recognize a substantial measure of intentionality in how it is directed. How societies define the role of electricity within a broader social vision, how they organize and manage the industry, and how they evaluate the trade-offs between different production and consumption choices in service of a social vision, are all proper subjects of deliberation. However, a robust and democratic decision-making process is a precondition for such debate. Governance of electricity is, therefore, the starting point of our exploration. In the discussion below, we argue that electricity reform narrows the exercise of collective public choice, by transforming the role of members of the public from citizen to consumer. This narrowing excludes consideration of important social objectives that deserve to be central to decision-making around electricity, particularly equity and the environment. There is a near total absence in the reform literature on the equity implications of the standard model. Yet, economic efficiency, the core objective of the standard model, often pulls in a quite different direction from equity. An explicit discussion of the trade-offs between the two is essential for a more complete and honest policy dialogue on electricity. Environmental implications too, are remarkably absent from the standard model, despite the enormous environmental footprint of the electricity sector. Any vision of a sustainable future can hardly afford to ignore the environmental consequences of electricity systems. Finally, electricity is not only important for national politics but is increasingly a factor on the global political stage. Electricity has implications for international cooperation and conflict through the upstream linkages of fuel supplies and, at the downstream end, through environmental impacts and growing international electricity trade. Yet, viewed through a financial and technical lens, the geopolitics of electricity reform are nearly invisible.

### link – kagan

#### Kagan uses flawed analysis and perpetuates imperialism

**Sorensen 4/20/12 –** Army veteran, writer for CounterPunch

(Christian, “Beltway Academics and the War Machine”, <http://www.counterpunch.org/2012/04/20/beltway-academics-and-the-war-machine/>, dml)

The Brookings Institution’s Dr. Robert Kagan also **actively perpetuates the US war machine**. Kagan argues that democracy, the free market, and peace among world powers are a direct result of the United States’ post-WWII leadership. Kagan’s vacuous arguments, which **neglect** the Pentagon’s support for dictatorships, the indigenous populations ravaged by the Pentagon’s protection of neoliberal economic policies, and the Pentagon’s tradition of interference in sovereign lands, illustrate how some DC academics and the Pentagon benefit symbiotically. In a fashion complementary to O’Hanlon, Kagan supports the Pentagon through **complacent manipulation** of financial data and **sycophantic clouding** of historical events. Kagan argues complacently that cutting defense spending will not revive USA’s fiscal health. Deeming any cuts in military funding as “reckless,” Kagan inaccurately insists that withdrawing from Middle East locales and cutting “all the waste [the Defense Department] can find,” would still amount to less than a 10 percent decrease in overall defense spending. Ending Overseas Contingency Operations, which are projected at roughly $118 billion, would save roughly 16.7 percent of the total $707 billion Pentagon FY 2012 budget. **Mathematics proves Kagan wrong**. Kagan demands that high levels of war funding continue, yet so many Pentagon contracts are extraneous or completely avoidable. For example, here are one day’s worth of Pentagon contracts from the month in which Kagan decried war spending cuts: Boeing received $94,985,863 for APACHE and CHINOOK weapon systems; Bristol Environmental & Engineering Services received $8,614,694 for hazardous waste cleanup in Alaska; Caterpillar received $6,771,854 for supplying equipment to Mubarak’s Egypt; Cazador Apparel received $11,626,483 for office furniture and equipment for BRAC 133; DRS C3 7 Aviation received $19,691,000 for surveillance hardware and services for Mubarak’s Egypt; EADS received $52,509,992 for UH-72A Helicopters, radio systems, and two engine filters; FLIR Systems received $15,892,846 for camera systems and operator classes; General Dynamics received $75,343,937 to reconfigure M1A2 tanks, for an M1A2S production facility in undemocratic Saudi Arabia, and for operations at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait; IAP Worldwide Services received $55,557,377 for transportation work in Kuwait and Iraq; Lockheed Martin received $18,708,099 for DDG 51 services; Marsh Creek received $10,363,735 for environmental cleanup in Alaska; Mission 1st Group received $3,000,000 for IT projects; N-Link received $6,751,326 for digital training facilities; PAE Government Services received $5,618,615 for equipment and support to the Afghan National Security Force; Science Applications International received $34,654,306 for operating a training center at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, for airborne ISR, and for US Central Command ammunition stocks. These contracts highlight many realities, **all of which Kagan dodges**. Should the Pentagon spend millions in one day on office furniture? Should the Pentagon have poisoned the environment in the first place, necessitating environmental remediation today? Should the Pentagon have supplied Mubarak’s Egypt and undemocratic nations like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia with materiel and weaponry? By **writing well and invoking fear**, Kagan stresses how frightful possibilities might occur if the Pentagon were to embrace fiscal responsibility. Clinging to dread, Kagan insists that the Pentagon’s military presence in “Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere make[s] it harder for [terrorists] to strike.” He again omits a sad reality: the Pentagon’s presence in each of these countries is **the single greatest recruiting tool** for those who resist the United States’ empire. By waging war around the world, the Pentagon feeds inflammatory rhetoric of its resisters. In another act of clerical overindulgence, Kagan complacently praises the “financial benefits” of US military hegemony. Critical minds wonder, who has actually benefited? **Certainly the military-industrial-congressional complex** profits directly. While retired four-star generals play golf, consult for Lockheed-Martin part-time, and collect a hefty retirement pension, global citizens pay for the Pentagon’s transgressions with blood, sweat, and tears. Inequality **doesn’t begin to describe** the “financial benefits” that transpire. Kagan flatters the Pentagon by **never mentioning civilian casualties**. Unfortunately for all, NATO forces accounted for 440 Afghan civilian deaths alone in the year 2010 and 410 in 2011. These figures exclude the 168 children who have died in CIA drone strikes across the border in Pakistan. US officials can apologize profusely for their errors, but they never consider the potency of revenge in Afghan culture. Even Kagan would fight back if a JDAM, AGM-114, or night raid wiped out his family. If Pentagon officials were actually serious about implementing their glorified counter-insurgency doctrine (FM 3-24), they would study Afghanistan’s history closely and demand that all commanders consider the prospect of revenge when pursuing any “intelligence” lead. “Promising” is how Pentagon officials describe the fact that the majority of civilian deaths are attributable to Taliban action. However, having occupied Afghanistan for over a decade, Pentagon commanders and policy-makers are responsible for all civilian deaths, which **Kagan obsequiously avoids** en route to perpetuating the Pentagon’s **wars of aggression**. Offering “offshore balancing” as the only strategy that could accompany Pentagon budget cuts, Kagan demonstrates **a sycophantic aspiration** to remain within the confines of **US imperialism**. Operating under an all-or-nothing rubric, he never considers that a partial withdrawal would be appropriate in many circumstances. For instance, the Pentagon’s presence in Germany, comprising dozens of separate installations, can be pared down without compromising “national security,” a frequently invoked but highly vague term. War would not break out with a reduction in the number of US facilities across Europe. One can even argue that **wars occur** because of, not despite, **the presence of the United States’ war machine**. Kagan’s concessions are noteworthy. He confesses that USA has been engaged in combat roughly 47 percent of the time during the last 112 years. He further admits that the US military has intervened abroad an astounding 70 percent of the time since the end of the Cold War. Kagan concedes that “many Americans are unhappy with the on-going warfare in Afghanistan… and that, if asked, a majority would say the United States should intervene less frequently in foreign nations.” Yet Congressional and military policy-makers, by Kagan’s own admission, do not listen to the voice of the US citizenry. Many thanks for Kagan’s honesty about our broken democracy. Kagan accurately asserts that addressing entitlement spending helps achieve fiscal responsibility, but confronting entitlements doesn’t mean that the Pentagon can continue to bathe in a $700 billion budget or that the policies behind imperial overreach can continue unbridled. The complacency and sycophantic stances adopted by Dr. Michael O’Hanlon and Dr. Robert Kagan shed light on a major force in post-9/11 USA. Like children obsessed with toy soldiers or obese citizens unfit for service, beltway academics **fail to see** how their personal veneration of USA’s warfare distorts public perception of foreign policy. Democrats and Republicans, unable to think independently, worship military power, passively contort support our troops into support the Pentagon, and neglect to dissent against imperial wars. As a result, military generals are immune from public scrutiny, the Pentagon’s wars continue unabated, and war funding continues to monopolize the federal government’s discretionary budget. In sum, professional profit, bolstered by personal veneration of the troops, actively perpetuates the Pentagon’s imperial reach. Throughout it all, O’Hanlon and Kagan **deliberately miss the point**: Tough love is the best love, and a tight leash on the Pentagon is better than no leash.

## 1NR – give back the land

### perm

**ANY law stemming from the USFG is a continuation of colonial domination. The system that they claim to reform is founded upon stolen land. Even if we imagine a world where every item on the progressive agenda was fulfilled, the state itself would be stronger and their project would be co-opted by the very forces that they claim to oppose.**

**Churchill, 03** (Acts of Rebellion: The Ward Churchill Reader. THE NEW FACE OF LIBERATION:

Indigenous Rebellion, State Repression, and the Reality of the Fourth World).

Most of us here identify ourselves as “progressives, ” so let’s start with the term “progressivism” itself. We don’t really have time available to go into this very deeply, but I’ll just observe that it comes from the word “progress, ” and that the progression involved is basically to start with what’s already here and carry it forward. The underlying premise is that the social order we were born into results from the working of “iron laws” of evolution and, however unpalatable, is therefore both necessary and inevitable. By the same token, these same deterministic forces make it equally unavoidable that what we’ve inherited can and will be improved upon. 7 The task of progressives, having apprehended the nature of the progression, is to use their insights to hurry things along. This isn’t a “liberal” articulation. It’s what’s been passing itself off as a radical left alternative to the status quo for well over a century. It forms the very core of Marx’s notion of historical materialism, as when he observes that feudalism was the social precondition for the emergence of capitalism and that capitalism is itself the essential precondition for what he conceives as socialism. Each historical phase creates the conditions for the next; that’s the crux of the progressive proposition. 8 Now you tell me, how is that fundamentally different from what Bush and Clinton have been advocating? Oh, I see. You want to “move forward” in pursuance of another set of goals and objectives than those espoused by these self-styled “centrists. ” Alright. I’ll accept that that’s true. Let me also state that I tend to find the goals and objectives advanced by progressives immensely preferable to anything advocated by Bush or Clinton. Fair enough? However, I must go on to observe that the differences at issue are not fundamental. They are not, as Marx would have put it, of “the base. ” Instead, they are superstructural. They represent remedies to symptoms rather than causes. In other words, they do not derive from a genuinely radical critique of our situation—remember, radical means to go to the root of any phenomenon in order to understand it 9 —and thus cannot offer a genuinely radical solution. This will remain true regardless of the fervor with which progressive goals and objectives are embraced, or the extremity with which they are pursued. Radicalism and extremism are, after all, not really synonyms. Maybe I can explain what I’m getting at here by way of indulging in a sort of grand fantasy. Close your eyes for a moment and dream along with me that the current progressive agenda has been realized. Never mind how, let’s just dream that it’s been fulfilled. Things like racism, sexism, ageism, militarism, classism, and the sorts of corporatism with which we are now afflicted have been abolished. The police have been leashed and the prison-industrial complex dismantled. Income disparities have been eliminated across the board, decent housing and healthcare are available to all, an amply endowed educational system is actually devoted to teaching rather than indoctrinating our children. The whole nine yards. Sound good? You bet. Nonetheless, there’s still a very basic—and I daresay uncomfortable—question which must be posed: In this seemingly rosy scenario, what, exactly, happens to the rights of native peoples? Face it, **to envision the progressive transformation of “American society” is to presuppose** that “America”—that is, **the United States—will continue to exis**t. And, self-evidently, **the existence of the United States is**, as it has always been and must always be, **predicated** first and foremost **on denial of the right of self-determining existence to every indigenous nation** within its purported borders. Absent this denial, the very society progressives seek to transform would never have had a landbase upon which to constitute itself in any form at all. So, it would have had no resources with which to actualize a mode of production, and there would be no basis for arranging or rearranging the relations of production. **All the dominoes fall from there**, don’t they? In effect, the progressive agenda is no less contingent upon the continuing internal colonial domination of indigenous nations than that advanced by Bill Clinton. 10 Perhaps we can agree to a truism on this score: Insofar as progressivism shares with the status quo a need to maintain the structure of colonial dominance over native peoples, it is at base no more than a variation on a common theme, **intrinsically a part of the very order it claims to oppose**. As Vine Deloria once observed in a related connection, “these guys just keep right on circling the same old rock while calling it by different names. ” Since, for all its liberatory rhetoric and sentiment, even the self-sacrifice of its proponents, **progressivism replicates the bedrock relations** with indigenous nations marking the present status quo, its agenda can be seen as serving mainly to increase the degree of comfort experienced by those who benefit from such relations. Any such outcome represents a **continuation and reinforcement of the existing order**, not its repeal. Progressivism is thus one possible means of consummating that which is, not its negation. 12

### at: europeans here first

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**Blood quantum rules ate racist and undermine Native sovereignty.**

**Attaguike, 98** (http://www.clevelandaim.net/struggle.html, by Faith Attaguile, Contributing Editor, Dark Night Field and Activist, February 1998).

The Bellecourts support blood quantum when it comes to Churchill, but not apparently when it comes to themselves. According to Joe Geshick writing for the Ojibwe News (published in the heart of Bellecourt "territory"), tribal records reveal that the brothers themselves are "essentially Frenchmen, possessing only 1/32 degree of Indian blood," information that never finds its way into News From Indian Country.59 Despite Chief Ross and others' repeated corrections of his intentional error, Paul DeMain continues to refer to Churchill as an "honorary Keetoowah, like Bill Clinton," editorially overriding the band's own determination as to his status.60 The blood quantum criterion, as historically tainted as tribal enrollment, is the pseudoscientific negative of the kind of racist thinking that created the one drop rule whereby one drop of negro blood makes you a negro. Blood quantum erases indigenous people by making Indians technically not Indian. Bellecourt-style identity policing, ignoring logic, history, and his movement's supposed ends, does anything but reinforce native sovereignty.61

### at: we k2 self-d

**We do not have to win that the aff is overtly racist to win a link—they point is not about ideology but about continued material oppression and disregard for self-determination.**

**Bradford, 03** (JD from U of Miami and PhD from Northwestern, visiting Prof Harvard Law, William, 27 Am. Indian L. Rev, ARTICLE: "With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts": Reparations, Reconciliation, and an American Indian Plea for Peace with Justice).

Most Indians would probably grant that most white Americans are not as racist as are the precedents and policies upon which federal Indian law is crafted. However, an absence of malice does not translate into an abundance of insight: by the early 1970s, the most well-intentioned non-Indians, self-assured that if injustice had yet to be fully remedied it had been consigned to an inglorious past and overwritten by a host of visionary federal programs assured to make necessary amends in the very near future, encouraged Indian tribes to "begin looking forward and to forget the injustices of the past" even as federal seizures of Indian land continued apace. Although many Indian tribes lauded a succession of federal policy statements supporting reconstitution of tribal cultural, political, and economic self-sufficiency, the relative intractability of Indian socioeconomic disadvantage over the past several decades revealed Indian Self-Determination as, at best, a half-empty promise. "Friends of the Indian" have ventured scant distance toward the legal reforms and institutional endowments necessary to alleviate the poverty and politico-economic insufficiency badgering Indian tribes and individuals.

### at: alt no s colonialism

1. **Rejecting the affirmative is an effective point of departure because any act of resistance opens up future possibilities that will create broader social change. And, the permutation is impossible because progressive notion of positive legal change must be abandoned before liberation is possible.**

**Churchill, 03** (Acts of Rebellion: The Ward Churchill Reader. THE NEW FACE OF LIBERATION:

Indigenous Rebellion, State Repression, and the Reality of the Fourth World).

Most of all, it’s imperative to remember that **the first element of oppositional power projection lies in refusal**. That means, in the context at hand, that **we must rid ourselves of the progressive notion that we can “get laws passed” to fix things**. You can hardly set out to undermine the authority of the state while endeavoring to put still more legislation, any kind of legislation, on the books. The only legitimate form of activity in the legislative arena is to pursue repeal of the tremendous weight of laws, ordinances, rules, and regulations that already exist. Meanwhile, at least some of them can be nullified by our conscious and deliberate refusal to comply with them. You’ve got to break “The Law”—whose law?—to get anywhere at all. To cop a line from Bob Dylan back in the days when he still had something to say, “To live outside the law, you must be honest. ” The flip side of the coin is that if you choose to “live inside the law you must be dishonest. ” Worse, you end up being the moral equivalent of a “Good German. ” Not a very lofty stature, that. Let me put it to you this way. If I were to say that our mutual goal is ultimately to achieve “freedom, ” everyone here would immediately agree. But then we’d become mired in some long philosophical debate about what we mean by that, because freedom is typically presented as a sort of abstract concept. Well, it’s not really so abstract, and most assuredly not “intangible. ” In fact, I think it can be quantified and measured. Try this: Freedom may be defined as absence of regulation. The more regulated you are, the less free, and vice versa. I’m not sure at this point that it matters much which laws you defy, there’s such a vast proliferation to choose from, and in some ways any of them will do for purposes of initiating a process of transforming the prevailing individual and mass psychologies from that of “going along” to that of refusal. Use your imagination, **pick a point of departure, it doesn’t matter how small or in what connection, and get on with it**. Once a particular bit of “unruliness” takes hold, it can be used as the fulcrum for prying open the next level, and so on. This is what Marcuse meant when he said that false consciousness is always breached at some “**infinitesimally small spot, ” but that any such breach might serve as an “Archimedean point for a broader emancipation**.” Can application of this principle actually produce results at higher levels? You bet. Look at Prohibition, the Eighteenth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution, to find an example. It was rescinded for one reason and one reason only: People refused to obey. It didn’t matter what penalties the state assigned to violating it, or what quantity of resources were pumped into the apparatus of enforcement, Prohibition was met with a curiously ubiquitous “culture of resistance” in all quarters of American society. Eventually, it was determined by those who make such decisions that attempts to enforce it were becoming so socially disruptive as to destabilize the state itself, and so the law was withdrawn. The so-called “War on Drugs” currently being waged by the state offers the prospect of a similar outcome over the long run, albeit at a statutory rather than constitutional level, particularly if we were astute enough to try and translate the rather substantial resistance to it into a coherent opposition politics. 35 The Black Panther Party’s strategy of focusing its recruitment on “lumpen proletarians”—street gang members, in plain English—made a lot of sense and is another idea that might be usefully resuscitated. 36 The primary purpose of everything we do must be to make this society increasingly unmanageable. That’s key. The more unmanageable the society becomes, the more of its resources the state must expend in efforts to maintain order “at home. ” The more this is true, the less the state’s capacity to project itself outwardly, both geographically and temporally. Eventually, a point of stasis will be reached, and, in a system such as this one, anchored as it is in the notion of perpetual growth, this amounts to a sort of “Doomsday Scenario” because, from there, things start moving in the other direction—“falling apart, ” as it were—and that creates the conditions of flux in which alternative social forms can really begin to take root and flourish. This is kind of a crude sketch, but its easy enough to follow. And, you know what? The rewards of following it don’t have to be deferred until the aftermath of a cataclysmic “revolutionary moment” or, worse, the progressive actualization of some fardistant Bernsteinian utopia (which would only turn out to be dystopic, anyway). 37 No, in the sense that **every rule and regulation rejected represents a tangibly liberating experience**, the rewards begin immediately and just keep on getting better. You will in effect feel freer right from the get-go.